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*Panthers & Tribesmen*  
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RAY ROGERS

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RONALD SAMPSON

---

**FRATRICIDE in the SIERRA CLUB** ROBERT A. JONES

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**MARTIN GREEN on Mailer, Amis & the New Conservatism**  
**ARTHUR S. MILLER on 'The Age of Discontinuity'**

# LETTERS

## curious

Metairie, La.

DEAR SIR: I wish to take exception to Robert Hatch's opinionated idiocies concerning Sjoman's *I Am Curious (Yellow)* [*The Nation*, Mar. 24]. He asks, rhetorically, it seems, "Are one's friends enigmas because one has never watched them in bed?" . . . But, in fact, presuming the sexual act to be the most important social action we are called upon to participate in . . . it may be possible that in a way, the answer to his question is yes—perhaps not literally, but given the above mentioned postulate might it not be impossible to fully know your friends without knowing their attitudes toward sex?

It is possible that the more important a role sex plays in a given individual's personality make-up, the greater the sexual knowledge which might be required in order to know that person. If we accept Hatch's rather dirty minded notion that Lena "is shown to be a nymphomaniac," then sex is presumably pretty important to her (and we know from Sjoman's diary that this latter idea was one of his intentions in making the film), and Mr. Hatch's argument loses its validity. Without showing sex, how are we to know, given the cinema as a visual medium, that Lena is sexually oriented? . . .

"I oppose showing it because it is not shown in real life," continues Hatch. I'd like to know his opinions on poisoning, fire-bomb raids, stabbing, Indian massacres, machine-gunning, or, if you like, taking baths, changing underwear, safe burglaries, or, to take another tack, flying chimney sweeps, dancing and singing poltergeists, and, perhaps best of all, humanly endowed Volkswagens (surely a contradiction in terms).

Is all that shown in real life? Surely Mr. Hatch jests. . . .  
Dennis J. Cipnic

DEAR SIR: I find I learn a good deal about my friends' attitudes toward sex from what they say to me; if Mr. Cipnic prefers to place his eye to a non-literal keyhole, that is ingenious of him. I don't know why he should call me dirty minded; probably because my review made him so cross. However, the suggestion that the only way to indicate that a character is "sexually oriented" is to show her actually coupling is too foolish to discuss. Has Mr. Cipnic been under the impression that Shakespeare's Cleopatra led a life of sexual abnegation?

As for the list of activities not usually seen in life, I have witnessed fire-bomb raids and machine-gunning in documentaries and would probably have similarly seen Indian massacres, if there had been any in my time. I can't say whether or not I've seen someone poisoned; how would you know unless the donor leered conspicuously? A safe burglary is a matter of opening a safe (which I have seen) under poor lighting conditions. I have seen a knife drawn in rage, but not plunged. Mixed bathing in the nude is not unknown to me, so I think I may say I have seen baths taken and underwear donned. The other items mentioned are matters of fantasy, which *I Am Curious* is not.

Robert Hatch

## price

Santa Barbara, Calif.

DEAR SIR: We were very pleased to see Joan Simon's review of *The Cry of Vietnam* by Thich Nhat Hanh in the Mar. 24 issue of *The Nation*.

I would like, however, to make one minor correction: the price of the cloth-bound edition is \$5, not \$4 as the review stated.

Alan Brilliant, Director, Unicorn Press

# EDITORIALS

## Tax Trade-Off

Ever shrewd, Mr. Nixon has submitted a tax proposal to the Congress which is in effect a double trade-off with a strong public relations flavor. It is worth analyzing, both for what it tells about the President's operating techniques and for its intrinsic importance.

Mr. Nixon definitely and specifically linked cutting in half, as of next January, the existing 10 per cent income tax surcharge with the repeal of the 7 per cent tax credit on business investment. He recommended the first only on condition that the Congress also enact the second. The neat feature of this linkage is that the tax receipts the government would lose in the 1970 fiscal year, beginning next July 1, as a result of reduction of the surcharge, would be almost exactly offset by the receipts it would gain from repeal of the investment tax credit. The reduction would amount to \$1.9 billion, the gain to \$1.8 billion, which is about as close as one can come in forecasts of this kind. If the Congress consents to Mr. Nixon's proposals without introducing changes of its own, the budget would remain unaffected.

There is also a poor-rich trade-off. The poor who pay taxes are to be relieved of part of their burden; the rich are not to be soaked, exactly, but those who now contribute nothing at all on large incomes, through income on tax-exempt bonds, for instance, or by taking advantage of other legal loopholes, are to be required to pay some tax. The effect will be morale lifting rather than bringing in large amounts of revenue, because relatively few millionaires are in the happy position of paying no income tax at all, or so little that they hardly feel the bite. The morale to be lifted is that of the medium-income taxpayer, who now scrutinizes his exemptions with the eye of a hungry chicken hawk, and even cheats a bit if he thinks he can get away with it. The manner in which the rich are to be gently mulcted is not spelled out in the President's message, but it may be by some disallowance of heretofore sacred depletion allowances, and the setting of a minimum tax for those with substantial incomes.

The poor are to be favored by a higher cutoff on net income. Some 2 million individuals or families would be relieved of liability entirely. Having no compensating exemptions, these taxpayers now pay what are substantial sums—for them—on small earnings. Examples cited by Eileen Shanahan in *The New York Times* (April 22) include young persons who on taxable income of \$1,700 now pay \$117 in federal income tax; married couples, such as students, with incomes of \$2,300 who pay \$100; these would be relieved of all liability. Similarly, the present \$3,000 cutoff for a family of four would be raised to \$3,500. The young, the elderly, the disadvantaged and the handicapped would benefit. And again the gains and losses to the federal government balance. The poverty-level earners would get an approximate \$1.1 billion tax break; the proposed "minimum income tax" on large incomes might yield \$1.2 billion.

What reveals Mr. Nixon's political astuteness is that it

leaves unimpaired his claim to having achieved a budgetary surplus, and relieves him of the need to embark on some difficult and politically dangerous cuts in the budget. Nobody is going to be hurt very much, at least for the present. The 7 per cent investment credit, for instance, has been dear to the heart of the business community. It is argued that nothing has contributed more to prosperity and the ability of U.S. business to compete abroad. In the last six or eight years American business has invested almost \$400 billion in new plant and equipment. But this inflationary influence must now be curbed and removal of the investment credit will curb it—but not abruptly. The credit will still apply to equipment ordered prior to the date of the Presidential message, nor will new investment be by any means completely choked off. If a company sees a sizable profit in putting new equipment into production, the loss of the tax credit will not discourage it.

The timing of Mr. Nixon's proposals may be wrong. The surtax is to be reduced by January 1970. Judging by the Administration's maneuvers in Vietnam, there is no assurance that the war will be over by then, or that the economy will not still be in an inflationary phase. Such a recommendation might better have been deferred till late fall. Moreover, the receipts from the surtax will be needed for backlog social programs, anti-poverty, etc. The developments of the coming summer, which may be hot despite the Administration's anti-crime measures, will be a factor in deciding whether this recommendation was wise. Of course, keeping the surtax and stopping the investment credit would have involved the kind of political uproar which Mr. Nixon deplures.

Mr. Nixon's only partially concealed hawkish tendencies also show up in his tax recommendations. He has done all this balancing and trading off with hardly more than a token cut in the military budget, which constitutes more than half of the total. The *Congressional Quarterly* estimated last year that the defense budget could be trimmed by at least \$10.8 billion without diminishing the nation's defense capability. But to espouse any such course would bring down on the Presidential head the wrath of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Laird, the President's own choice for what is probably the most important job in the Cabinet. The President opted for an era of good feeling between the White House and the Pentagon.

## The Mobile Poor

Once the President had put himself on record as wishing to give the taxpaying poor a break, it would seem that he was obligated to extend the solicitude of the federal government to the non-taxpaying poor at the bottom of the heap. And it happens that the obligation he thus assumed, perhaps unwittingly, synchronizes neatly with the Supreme Court's 6-to-3 decision outlawing state residency requirements for welfare benefits. Mitchell Ginsberg, director of New York City's Human Resources Agency and a brilliant technician in his field, hails the decision as "a major step forward in the rights of the poor." It is not an exaggeration and it will probably force the federal govern-

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# THE NATION

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ment to establish national and livable standards of welfare assistance.

In the decades when the country still had a frontier, the freedom of the poor to travel was regarded not only as a right but as a contribution to the national welfare. A man could always go West and carve a homestead for himself out of the wilderness. The modern counterpart, with some stretch of the imagination, is the corporation nomad who, with his family, color TV and other chattels, goes where advancement in the corporate hierarchy leads him—naturally at company expense. As the working-class phrase has it, he goes “to better himself.” But if this is sound practice for the executive, why isn’t it sound for the welfare recipient? The majority opinion by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. states that it is “constitutionally impermissible” for a state to enforce a waiting period “for the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the state,” in that this would inhibit the liberty of all citizens to travel for whatever lawful purpose, even if the purpose is to “better themselves” on welfare. This, obviously, makes welfare a national issue and will lead eventually to “federalization” of the program.

Welfare Secretary Finch estimates that invalidation of the residency laws will require additional payments of about \$140 million. It will not, as some groundlessly fear, cause a pell-mell rush to states like New York, where urban benefits are relatively high. Since 1940, around 22 million Americans have moved off the land, but for the last two years the migration has subsided. Actually, the poor have not moved in very large numbers to enjoy the luxury of welfare; they have been driven out by the starvation promised them in the areas where once they worked the land. The gradual recognition of their rights, the gradual realization that their plight is a national responsibility, is one of the few good auguries to be discerned in present-day American society.

## The Easy Job

To put it very bluntly, the war in Vietnam is worse than ever, and there seems no reason to believe—on the basis of the public record—that Washington has lost its desire for a military victory.

Having just returned from talks with the NLF and Hanoi delegations in Paris, I know nothing that a careful reader of the American press doesn’t know: since November, General Abrams has been under orders to press the air and ground war in the South; this directive was repeated in February by Secretary Laird; American ground offensives increased from November through January, while those of “the other side” diminished; B-52 raids—hundreds, sometimes thousands, of tons per day—have rained on South Vietnam and Laos; American planes have often bombed North Vietnam since Mr. Nixon’s inauguration, the excuse being that North Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns impudently shoot down our reconnaissance aircraft. Finally, the recent enemy offensive, resulting in greatly increased American deaths, was explained by Ambassador Harriman as a response to American pressure, and not as attempts to “torpedo the talks.”

Almost no one in Washington believes James Reston’s recent inside scoop on Nixon’s intent to withdraw, and few in Paris take seriously Secretary Rogers’ claims of secret talks. All the evidence, the 10 per cent reduction notwithstanding, points to undiminished American ambition for a military or diplomatic victory.

The Vietnamese, however, continue to talk in historical, legal and moral terms: of their 2,000-year struggle against foreigners, of their betrayal at Geneva, and of the right of all peoples to independence. Madame Binh, Deputy Leader of the NLF delegation, pointed out to us that Americans have an *obligation*—in view of their own tradition—to support the NLF. When my wife and I expressed skepticism about the sympathies of Americans for contemporary revolutions, Madame Binh, rather wistfully we thought, added: “We have to believe in your good intentions—even if we are wrong.”

Therefore it is painful for the Vietnamese to observe the maneuverings of Lodge, Bunker and Laird, who speak in manipulative metaphors of “force levels,” “strengthening the Saigon government,” “helping the ARVN shoulder the burden,” and “token de-escalation.”

When we left the NLF residence, I expressed to Madame Binh a common sentiment of many visitors from America to “the other side”: the desperate inadequacy of the peace movement in the face of the decades of Vietnamese loss and suffering. “Ah, no, Professor Mirsky,” she replied, “our job is the easy one. We have only 550,000 Americans in our country, and we know how to deal with them. But *you* have 200 million. . . .”

JONATHAN MIRSKY

## Who Says It’s Safe?

In view of the large numbers of scientists, engineers and administrators who have dedicated themselves to the development of nuclear weapons, it was inevitable that when testing in the atmosphere was banned in 1963, the Atomic Energy Commission would increase its activities underground. Underground explosions have in fact increased both in frequency and power, the latter rising into the megaton range.

The possibility that these tremendous explosions may involve risks to the civilian populations in the vicinity of the test sites came to the fore when, a few weeks ago, the Howard Hughes organization, which has bought up much of Las Vegas and vicinity, threatened to bring legal action to block tests of large-caliber bombs at the Nevada test site (see editorial, “Odds on the Croupier,” *The Nation*, April 14). That there may be actual danger in such tests has been confirmed more recently by Dr. Kenneth S. Pitzer, president of Stanford University, formerly director of research for the AEC and until last January a member of the President’s Science Advisory Committee. It would be difficult to find anyone less likely to take an alarmist view.

In a recent address before the American Chemical Society’s 157th national meeting, where he received the Priestly medal, the society’s highest award, Dr. Pitzer pointed out that both Nevada and the Aleutians (where

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a second AEC test site is projected) are active seismic regions. Further, two moderately large underground nuclear explosions at the Nevada site last year triggered a series of small earthquakes. What concerns Dr. Pitzer and parties at interest is that the next detonation might set off an earthquake severe enough to menace life and property.

Recognizing the possibility of trouble, the AEC recently sponsored a conference in Las Vegas on off-site safety precautions and issued a report which Dr. Pitzer terms "inadequate." The weakness is that the possible risks have been examined primarily in what Dr. Pitzer calls "closed circles, with the effective judgment rendered by officials committed to the test program," and with much of the relevant data classified. Other than the design of the weapons under test, there is no need for classification, and all data should be evaluated by experts not connected with the government agency. They should then be discussed with Congressmen, governors and other public officials, as well as the public, so that balanced judgments can be arrived at without suspicion as to conflict of interest.

In a broader survey, Dr. Pitzer observed that the dangers and difficulties arising from new technologies "are forcing us to abandon the laissez-faire viewpoint that the natural result of scientific discoveries will be desirable improvements in our conditions of life." He cited the proposed supersonic transport as an example. If this general caution had been heeded a few decades ago, we would not now find ourselves so deep in environmental difficulties.

## Rolfe Humphries

It is fitting that Rolfe Humphries' latest book published before his death is a translation which superbly combines his scholarly gifts as a classicist with his love for the natural and contemporary—*The De Rerum Natura of Titus Lucretius Carus*, called in Humphries' translation, *The Way Things Are* (Indiana University Press). Between 1929 and 1965 he recorded his sense of the way things were for him in eight books of poetry, while also translating Virgil, Ovid, Juvenal, Martial and Garcia Lorca's "Poet in New York" and "Gypsy Ballads." Over the years, he wrote, taught and picked up more than the usual share of awards and fellowships. His long association with *The Nation* as a poet and reviewer reflects his charmingly diverse interests, from his 1937 review of Garcia Lorca's "Lament for the Death of a Bullfighter" to his 1967 review of three books on baseball and football. The last poem we received from him arrived with a characteristic

note scrawled across the bottom of the page: "No excuse in the world for this, except the fatuous delight in one's own idiotic brand of humor." It appears on page 574 of this issue and will be included in a new collection of Humphries' poems to be published by Indiana in the fall.

## Big Picture

It is a business axiom that big executives concern themselves with the big picture, leaving details to underlings. Let us, then, look at the scandalous housing situation in the cities—and spilling over into the suburbs—with this thought in mind.

The hideous mess in the City of New York was exposed once more, even more graphically, in a series by Donald Singleton in the *Daily News*, starting April 22. The *News* depends for its enormous circulation mainly on the working class and those of the poor who are able to afford a paper. They buy it even though it does not normally exert itself unduly on their behalf. But policy aside, the *News* is got out by some of the ablest journalists in the business (a few of them also contribute to *The Nation*), and Singleton's series is right up to its standards of force and clarity.

He starts off with the statement that New York is at the threshold of the greatest housing crisis ever seen in any modern Western city not wrecked by war. It affects not only the 8 million people in the city but also the millions in the suburbs. The poorest live in "crumbling tenements which equal the hovels of the Middle Ages," and even the relatively prosperous are squeezed by a shortage of decent housing and zooming rents. But, says Singleton, if the present situation is serious, the future is "absolutely terrifying." Residential housing is being built on an entirely inadequate scale and what there is of it is in the luxury class. The outlook is that people will be pitching tents in the streets and vacant lots, and squatting in empty apartments—and rioting.

Yet, walking about the financial district and midtown, one sees skyscrapers going up on block after block. Ada Louise Huxtable, the brilliant architecture critic of *The New York Times*, comments on this phenomenon in the April 21 issue. Oblivious of the housing crisis, the "space-hungry, cost-no-object corporations" are moving from one new, luxurious office building into another even newer and more luxurious. Such labor and materials as are left over go into luxury housing. In the line of housing amenities, whether for living or for working, the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer.

The big picture is that, under our present arrangements, it cannot be otherwise. There just is no money in moderate-priced residential housing in the big cities; in the suburbs, also, builders are gravitating toward homes in the \$40,000-and-up class, some of them second homes for people who own or rent luxury apartments in the city. The 1968 Federal Housing and Urban Development Act calls for 26 million new and rehabilitated housing units over the next ten years. These units are not being built. The program is a pipe dream, on which an able man like George Romney should not be wasting his time. It is a pipe dream be-

cause it depends, as Miss Huxtable writes, on "funds that are not available, construction techniques and practices that hold down productivity and a lobster quadrille of bureaucratic buck-passing from Federal, to state, to local levels."

In Europe the abolition of antiquated building codes and medieval union practices have achieved considerable success in solving housing crises as bad as ours. But the

richest country in the world disdains such efforts. As long as business is business, and profit is the motivating force of construction, funds for housing will flow into commercial and luxury construction, where the returns are high and the risk low. As long as the motto is each for himself and the devil take the hindmost, the housing crisis can only grow worse. That is the big picture, and the refusal to look at it becomes increasingly perilous.

## PANTHERS & TRIBESMEN

# BLACK GUNS ON CAMPUS

### RAY ROGERS

*Mr. Rogers is a staff writer on the Los Angeles Times.*

#### Los Angeles

In the black liberation movement, where relationships and alliances change from issue to issue, militant advocates of the seizure of power have literally fought and killed one another for control. Ideological imperatives may be claimed, but behind these is the fact that whoever controls this movement will participate in the direction of millions of dollars worth of black programs that are now being situated on college campuses everywhere in the country. And anyone, or any black nationalist organization for that matter, threatening to expose or interfere with this power move may expect to suffer dire consequences.

At UCLA, two of California's most militant factions—the Black Panther Party and Maulana Ron Karenga's US organization—were brought together in the choosing of a director for the school's newly founded Afro-American Studies Center. The leaders of the Black Students Union (BSU) had hoped that their presence would help "keep the school's administration honest." However, everyone overlooked one potential source of trouble: the Panthers and US have been archenemies for a long time. While the Panthers like to be known as super-black-revolutionaries, US, a tightly knit cultural nationalist organization, has demonstrated an ability to overwhelm if not usurp other black nationalist organizations. And as a result, Panthers John Jerome Huggins and Alprentice (Bunchy) Carter were shot to death by members of US.

During the weeks before the shooting, a good deal of anxiety had built up because a number of other "students" were toting guns around campus. Consequently, some leaders in the BSU thought it would be wise to invite a black "coalition" on campus to tranquilize the situation. This coalition consisted of local community leaders, in addition to a member of the UCLA faculty and Karenga himself. Some of the members were not completely awake to the urgent need for this coalition, and participated lethargically.

Consequently, Karenga and the coalition's organizers more and more controlled the direction of the group. It was supposed to be acting in an advisory capacity, but

when it stepped into the situation, the coalition brought its own candidate for the job of director, and insisted that he was so highly qualified that he must be paid \$23,000, the salary of a full professor, and several thousand dollars more than the school had expected to pay. The administration was disposed to hire the coalition's nominee, but negotiations hung fire on the matter of salary, Chancellor Charles Young feeling that the man did not have the academic credentials to warrant the sum asked.

While these talks were going on, some factions became highly suspicious of the coalition's motives for insisting that their candidate should get the job. It was suggested that through him the coalition expected to control the millions of dollars that would be directed into the program.

Huggins and Carter were UCLA students, as well as Panthers, and immensely popular on campus. They were loud in their opposition to the coalition nominee, and many black students sided with them. They were opposed by a minority who were adamant supporters of US. At a meeting off-campus, Karenga is purported to have told the students that if the administration did not accept the coalition's candidate, they should "investigate" the possibilities of "disrupting the school."

Meek in the face of this hostility, the students maintained that they should have more time to study other candidates. On top of their other suspicions, they doubted that the man being pushed was sufficiently "community conscious" for the job. As late as the day of the shooting, January 17, the students were still hassling over the qualifications they expected the director to possess. On a Campbell Hall bulletin board they had outlined these qualifications: "Academic: political science; Ph.D. Emotional (soul): student interest, community commitment."

Later in the day, a meeting agreed on these qualifications, and after it the students were filing out, laughing and talking. Then without warning the gunfire broke out and Huggins and Carter fell dead. After secret, two-day Los Angeles County grand jury hearings, tightly guarded and designed to eliminate any possibility of retaliation against witnesses, five high-ranking members of US were indicted on charges of conspiracy and murder of the two Panthers. The conspiracy charge stems from testimony that the assassinations were planned well in advance. Of the five

men named in the grand jury indictment, the police so far have been successful in arresting only two, George (Ali Sultani) Stiner, and his brother, Larry (Sakia) Stiner. Larry, according to the police, had a bullet wound in his right shoulder when he surrendered to the police three days after the shooting, and it is believed that Carter pulled a gun and fired just before he was hit.

The fear that swept the campus after the shooting still hangs in the air. One young woman who was outspoken against the intrusion of Karenga and the coalition has had to change her address. At first the shooting stalled efforts to establish the Afro-American Studies Center, at a time when similar programs for other minorities were well on their way to becoming part of the university's American Cultures Institute for Research and Community Action.

Since the UCLA assassinations there have been several more shootings, one of which was almost fatal to another Panther. It has been established that US was also behind these attacks. Police say that they are hindered in their attempts to stop the assaults by interference from Mayor Yorty's staff. On several occasions this interference has come on the heels of a "good arrest," the US member being out of jail shortly after he was booked. The Stiner brothers were booked late last year for a \$4,000 Santa Ana armed robbery, felonious assault and kidnap, but when the UCLA shooting occurred they were loose on \$31,250 bail provided by a left-wing organization. On March 21, they were convicted of the Santa Ana charges and sentenced to from fifteen years to life.

If it is true that Yorty's office is solicitous of the welfare of US members, there are probably two reasons. Karenga is adamantly anti-Communist, as is the Mayor, and his organization, though not large (perhaps 200 members), is tightly disciplined and capable of providing Yorty with a political wedge into the black community. Karenga was known as Ron Everett when he graduated *cum laude* from UCLA a few years ago. He flirted for a time with the Muslims while employed by the county as a welfare case worker (there are Muslim overtones to his demands upon his followers for self-sacrificing and unquestioning loyalty, and in some of the cultural aspirations of his creed). Shortly after the 1965 Watts riots, US and Karenga won national attention with a *Life* cover story.

Although the Panthers have achieved much notoriety as perhaps the best armed black nationalist organization in America, police say that US is as formidable. Karenga, however, claims to deplore violence:

Sometimes brothers get so hung up in the myth of revolution that they talk about bringing America to her knees, and they can't even wipe out one police station.

A lot of brothers play revolutionary: they read a little Fanon, a little Mao and some Marx. Although this information is necessary, it is not sufficient, for we must develop a new play of revolution for black people here in America.

US members are divided into "tribes" and given Swahili names. They are instructed to live by the tenets of *The Quotable Karenga* (their leader has also read a little Mao) which directs them along a "Path of Blackness," an alternative to the standards of the white society. "The seven-

fold path of blackness is think black, talk black, act black, create black, buy black, vote black and live black."

(As for voting black, it was reported that during the weeks before the Los Angeles mayoral primary, Karenga was approached by a Yorty staff member and asked to support the Mayor over Thomas Bradley, a black candidate. Karenga turned him down.)

The first serious clash with the Panthers occurred in 1967 on a Los Angeles street. Guns were drawn but the somewhat mysterious confrontation ended without a major incident. The second clash was no mystery; it came about over a difference of strategy. During the planning of a fund-raising rally for Huey P. Newton at the Los Angeles Sports Arena, the Panthers insisted that the police should not be allowed in the building, since this would be an affront to the major figures in the black liberation movement who would be present—Stokely Carmichael, James Forman and Rap Brown, as well as Reies Tijerina of the Federal Alliance of Land Grants movement. Eldridge Cleaver, minister of Panther information, asked Karenga to intercede with the police on behalf of the Panthers, but Karenga refused. This made Cleaver and the Panthers angry. Apparently, they had been under the impression that they could get anything they wanted from any organization in the movement.

The next evening some 200 black people gathered in the basement of a Baptist church to hear Carmichael and Tijerina recite the plight of the black and brown peoples. While Carmichael, honorary prime minister of the Pan-



thers, was speaking. Karenga and some of his followers entered the auditorium. The Panthers bristled. A Panther official approached the stage and whispered something in Carmichael's ear. The speaker tried to brush aside the interference, but the man persisted. He took Carmichael by the arm and gently pulled him off the stage. Later, it was learned that the Panthers had refused to allow the meeting to proceed while Karenga and his lieutenants were in the auditorium.

There is no discernible difference of ideology or goals between these two organizations; the "sevenfold path of blackness" can be walked as readily by a Panther as by one of Karenga's tribesmen. Nor does either group have a

solid footing in the black community, though both claim to be working for its good. So they are testing each other to see which shall seize the power, and they have the guns with which to make the tests terribly rigorous. As of now, neither the Panthers nor US (nor for that matter any other organization) has come up with satisfactory answers to all the existing problems. And until they settle the pecking order among themselves, they are not apt to provide them. Karenga, an articulate and eloquent man, says that black people must banish the white frame of reference from their minds because it excludes the concept of blackness. But that, clearly, is too simple a prescription for the social and political complexities of black liberation.

## POWER OVER KNOWLEDGE

# WHAT IS A UNIVERSITY?

## RONALD SAMPSON

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*Bristol, England*

When a culture betrays unmistakable signs of loss of confidence, it would be very odd if the universities were not swift to register symptoms of the change: they are after all the most significant organized seismographs of cultural tremors. The recent and continuing disturbances and unrest in the universities have reverberated through four continents, from San Francisco to Nairobi, from Tokyo to Rome, from New York to London, Paris and Prague. That the forms of protest, the dialectics of rebellion and repression and belated negotiation, should resemble one another is not surprising. What is striking is the resemblance of the causes of the unrest, as judged by analyses made in different countries. Compare, for example, the two following diagnoses, one summarized from a report in *Le Monde* during Paris' May days last year, the other from a *Fortune* magazine survey of student unrest in America, based on evidence collected from forty college campuses, published in January. For convenience of exposition I group the different issues under three separate if overlapping heads, the political, sociological and metaphysical.

Politically speaking, both American and French students were primarily incensed by the war in Vietnam and were militantly opposed to all forms of imperialism. Since the Americans, unlike the French, are directly involved in Vietnam, draft resistance and a belief in principled civil disobedience as a method have been specific features of the American scene. American hostility to what has traditionally been called "democratic politics" is matched by French hostility to organization as such. In sociological terms, both alike share a deep and conscious hostility to hierarchical structures of power and competitive institutions, beginning in the university itself with the classificatory examination system. While Americans are described

as rejecting the authority of the "authorities" in universities, in business, in government, the French are seen to be essentially afraid of finding themselves caught up and absorbed in a struggle to climb the social ladder, fearful that they are predestined to fill a role assigned to them as *chiens de garde* of bourgeois society. The one thing all the American dissidents had in common was a total lack of interest in making money. Raised in affluence, they not only scorned the values on which wealth rested but saw in it the essential reason for the moral compromise or betrayal of the liberalism which the older generation ostensibly stood for. The Americans' hostility to war as such was particularly marked and comprehensive. More than half would refuse to go to war to protect the "national interest," "our allies," "our honor." As few as 14 per cent would be willing to go to war to honor existing commitments. While the French appear not so candid in public discussion in this highly sensitive area, there is no reason to suppose that dissident French youth are substantially more inclined to tolerate chauvinism than are their American counterparts. In psychological terms, while it was suggested that Americans are less inhibited and more difficult to intimidate, having been reared in liberal family households, where the mother no longer plays an aggressively dominant role vis-à-vis her son, the French emphasized a conscious dissatisfaction with the parent-child relationship in existing family mores, seeing the authoritarianism of teacher to pupil, of official to citizen as a reflection of the earlier pattern within the family.

These issues, which I have labeled the political and sociological, have been well ventilated in the press, although the discussion concerning hierarchical power and "anarchy" is often merely scathing and is rarely permitted to search below the surface. The third category of questions which comes up when student unrest is under the microscope—what I term the metaphysical—has received only the scantiest mention, partly, perhaps, because it does not lend itself so readily to journalistic treatment. Yet the

issue is absolutely fundamental, and references to it, although sparse and fragmentary, persist. *Le Monde* lists as high among French student grievances anxiety about the curriculum, a preoccupation with what shall be taught and how, a widespread conviction that the claim of the sciences to objectivity will not withstand close scrutiny, that positivism as a philosophy is less than honest, that sociologists, claiming to speak of society without a political standpoint, claim the impossible and are thereby guilty of deceit. On the American side, though again the references are skimpy, the following significant suggestions have been thrown out as characteristic of student dissatisfactions: the belief that science rests on a degree of specialization that leads inevitably to the fragmentation and consequent distortion of reality, that science is pursued increasingly for ends which have become more and more divorced from genuine human needs, that the dominance of positivistic assumptions in both philosophy and literature has led to sterility, that in economics the positivist concept of "economic man" has twisted the science to suit the demands of capital, that positivism in psychology has produced a behaviorist methodology fruitful at best for the study of rats, hamsters and apes, but mutilating and severely inhibiting in its effects on the study of man.

What I wish to suggest here is that, while the political grievances have naturally been more urgent and have furnished an immediate motivation for the minority of activists, those militants and political sophisticates have been able to enlist a much wider, normally more docile, section of the student body, because of a deep-seated frustration and resentment mixed with confusion on the metaphysical issue. For it is that issue which not only determines the meaning the individual gives to his life but which also ultimately determines the shape of the academic curricula, the organization of knowledge, the choice of subject matter and the styles and methods of teaching.

Indeed in France that kind of concern would appear to have been uppermost in the minds of dissident students. The rebellion at Nantes was launched when students plastered the walls with notices attacking "psychology"; similarly at Nanterre the 22nd March Movement was initiated by students of social psychology who boycotted examinations and issued a leaflet, headed, "Why do we need sociologists?" Psychology was indicted at Nantes on the grounds that it systematically aims at subordinating individual behavior to false social values, specifically by conditioning the workers to consume trash and acquiesce in exploitation, and so to undermine their will to resist; and that many students are successfully taken in by a glamorous pseudo-scientific cloak, which conceals an assault upon liberty with intent to subvert the workers, and deliberately blurs the monstrous gap between the reality of the system and the immense creativity of human potential. Modern psychology, associated in particular with American sociological jargon, was explicitly rejected *in toto* in favor of the values of personal freedom, creativity, the "innocence of desire" and happiness.

The sociologists of Nanterre drew up a parallel indictment of the methods, concepts and fundamental aims of social psychology as now taught. Methodologically, the science rests on a false claim to impartial, value-free pro-

cedures; its techniques of investigation produce an excessive specialization whereby an organically unified reality is subjected to interdisciplinary fragmentation. The concepts of social psychology are primarily concerned with technical means of securing social adaptation and resolving social conflict. Similarly, political sociology concerns itself exclusively with man in his role as voter, as though existing electoral "choices" exhausted the available rational alternatives. The fundamental aims and unstated presuppositions of sociology are the acceptance of the present economic system as rational, the acceptance of its own role to help "rationalize" that system—without ever questioning its axioms or endangering its stability or its profits, now euphemistically referred to as "economic growth," and quietly substituting for the traditional class struggle a routine acceptance of struggle for personal status.

In short, student unrest reflects a fundamental questioning of and dissatisfaction with the very philosophy of knowledge on which the university as an institution is ultimately based. All human institutions, although limited by the physical environment and laws of the physical world, necessarily reflect, insofar as they are malleable, the existing condition of human consciousness. When the institutions show signs of breaking down and failing to meet elemental human needs, the inference will rapidly be drawn that the existing culture rests on a false condition of human consciousness. More and more people become aware of Blake's "mind-forged manacles." Since universities are by definition directly concerned with the critical review and dissemination of the ideas which determine consciousness, a cultural crisis is bound to express itself first and most dramatically in our society in the universities; and that is what is now happening.

Given the gravity and far-reaching nature of the crisis, it is odd that it has inspired so little literature. I know of only one attempt to examine the problem in any real depth in recent times, and that is Sir Walter Moberly's *The Crisis in the University*, published twenty years ago. Moberly presents an able statement of the problem, but the recommendations suffer from the fact that, while the author identifies himself as a "Christian," he resignedly accepts the reality that Christianity cannot form the metaphysical basis of a university in a decidedly post-Christian world. In short, Moberly is a liberal, believing not so much in Christianity as in tolerance, a value that is precious but itself susceptible of widely differing interpretations, and in any event not adequate to cope with a crisis of the present dimensions.

By far the most authoritative document that we possess in this field is John Henry Newman's *The Idea of a University*, originally published in 1852. After more than a century, it still towers above everything else that has been written in this field. For although Newman's religious insight may have been limited, partial, even esoteric, it was genuine at root and stemmed from the authentic religious tradition of the West. His was an exceptionally eloquent plea for freedom to study and teach, not in order to impart knowledge of a specialism or skill in a specific sphere but to enlarge understanding of the whole of reality and

man's place within it. Reality was an ordered, unitary whole emanating from the creative will of its divine Author; and therefore the mind of man could receive illumination only by mastering, as well as some aspect of reality, some knowledge of its relations to other, associated aspects. Truth consists of a myriad of facts and their interrelations; knowledge is an apprehension of such facts and the conditions of their relatedness. All taken together constitute an integrated whole; but the human mind, though richly endowed, cannot assimilate the whole at a glance. We must view reality partially or under abstractions; and these one-sided, one-dimensional views, concerned more with relations than with things themselves, we call sciences.

The sciences by definition never tell us all that can be said about a thing. They aim rather to arrange and classify facts according to specific attributes relevant to a given context, to relate effects to causes, to subsume separate phenomena under general laws or hypotheses, wherewith to attempt predictions, susceptible to verification or at least repudiation. They aim to extend knowledge with a view to enlarging the possibilities of human control over otherwise random phenomena. In short, science has a common subject matter, which it views under many different aspects; its results are true so far as they go, but separate, partial, incomplete, dependent upon their interrelatedness with all the other aspects under which any given phenomenon may be viewed and examined by other similarly partial, one-sided scientists. To imagine that any single science can exhaust reality from its own viewpoint would be to create a new "reality" which would in fact be "a portentous unreality."

Newman designed this analysis of the role of science in the universe of knowledge to lead to the conclusion that no single science can be self-sufficient, but must take account of the findings of all the other sciences, pre-eminent among which, according to him, is theology or the science of God—an invisible, intelligent Being, absolutely distinct from the world but acting on and through it. His method of demonstration is the common one of reasoning by analogy. Supposing, he says, a professor were to construct a world of sciences from which psychology, or the entire realm of human volition, were to be excluded, on the ground that it was not a legitimate part of the corpus of knowledge. What a grotesque world would then appear as the object of knowledge! There is no suggestion that Newman was being consciously prophetic; rather his intent was to introduce an example so obviously outrageous as to permit our reason to follow by analogy the less obvious irrationality of excluding theology. The irony lies in the fact that Newman was describing as absurd hypothesis what a later generation was to grow accustomed to accepting as normal. Newman states the case for the absurdity of behaviorism so eloquently that it is worth quoting liberally from his argument:


Let us imagine a project for organizing a system of scientific teaching, in which the agency of man in the material world cannot allowably be recognized, and may allowably be denied. Physical and mechanical causes are exclusively to be treated of; volition is a forbidden subject. A prospectus is put out, with a list of sciences . . . but not a word about the mind and its powers, except what is said in explanation of the omission . . . what

sort of exactness or trustworthiness, what philosophical largeness, will attach to views formed in an intellectual atmosphere thus deprived of some of the constituent elements of daylight? . . . Here are professors . . . free to scoff at the action of the mind upon matter, or the claims of mutual justice and charity. Common sense and indeed public opinion set bounds at first to so intolerable a licence; yet as time goes on, an omission which was originally but a matter of expedience, commends itself to the reason; and at length a professor is found, more hardy than his brethren . . . who takes on him to deny psychology *in toto*, to pronounce the influence of mind in the visible world a superstition, and to account for every effect which is found in the world by the operation of physical causes. . . .

Human exploits, human devices, human deeds, human productions, all that comes under scholastic terms of "genius" and "art," and the metaphysical ideas of "duty," "right" and "heroism," it is his office to contemplate all these merely in their place in the eternal system of physical cause and effect. . . .

I do but say this: that, man existing, no University Professor, who had suppressed in physical lectures the idea of volition, who did not take volition for granted, could escape a one-sided, a radically false view of the things which he discussed; not indeed that his own definitions, principles, and laws would be wrong, or his abstract statements, but his considering his own study to be the key of everything that takes place on the face of the earth, and his passing over anthropology, this would be his error.

Prophetic as this passage proved to be, it is doubtful that Newman himself foresaw the rapidity with which such a contingency, invoked merely for the purposes of argument, would actually be realized. By the turn of the



Mena, Jours de France

century, the behaviorist revolution in what was still politely termed "psychology" was under way. In 1906, in an address delivered in honor of Thomas Huxley, Ivan Petrovich Pavlov stated: "Mankind will possess incalculable advantages and extraordinary control over human behavior when the scientific investigator will be able to subject his fellow men to the same external analysis as he would employ for any natural object and when the human mind will contemplate itself not from within but from without." The passage, short as it is, reveals the obsession which was to dominate academic psychology down to our time. Since science has demonstrated such formidable power in its investigation of the physical world, and if the only way whereby corresponding power can be obtained and exerted over the human world is to reduce human souls to the status of animate objects, then that must be done. The passion to predict, to control by means of laws induced from observed uniformities of behavior, dominates every other aspect of the quest for knowledge. Every other value yields before the inexhaustible craving for scientific status, prestige and power.

In the writings of John B. Watson, who if a lesser figure than Pavlov has exercised much influence in the West, the obsessive partiality of Pavlov to a single aspect of reality attained a new level of arrogance. All that was essentially human was ruthlessly discarded in an effort to master the laws of man's being, shrunk to the level of an organism, responding to external stimuli, the sole test of adequacy being that of a state of equilibrium with the environment. Watson was at pains to emphasize that the methods appropriate to the investigation of the birds of Tortugas were wholly adequate for the investigation of natives of Australian tribes and of educated Europeans. In the latter case, he conceded, several lifetimes might be necessary to conduct the research adequately, because the number of effective stimuli might be expected to be larger, the types of response more varied than in the case of the aborigines and still more than in the case of the birds. The information so acquired would no doubt be correct, but what are we to say in the presence of a brashness that concocts so portentous an unreality? As Newman anticipated: "I say, it would not be his science which was untrue, but his so-called knowledge which was unreal." Such a teacher would be "no longer a teacher of liberal knowledge, but a narrow-minded bigot." But bigoted or not, unreal or not, this is the established tradition which constitutes the core of our academic psychological teaching, while Freud with his immense wealth of insight into the whole realm of human fear, repression, censorship and inhibition, with consequences of incalculable importance to mankind, remains studiously and deliberately neglected outside a comparatively small number of private or specialist institutions.

When one turns from psychology to social psychology or sociology, the story is essentially the same. Science, purporting to be value-free, seeks knowledge of a kind which will enable it to classify and predict, in short, to enlarge the area of control, and thus give power. Since the spiritual life of man is immaterial, immeasurable, non-empirical, spontaneous and free, it is not susceptible to

such treatment and is therefore declared to fall outside the proper scope of the science in question. The subject matter left to sociology is that capable of comparative measurement, namely the external behavior of men. Sociology is a behavioral science, dedicated to the enlargement of the sphere of possible behavioral control. Because that is all that science can do, it is taken for granted that that is what we ought to do. As a result, sociology, in common with positivist philosophy, ignores questions of right or wrong as such. Displaying the "modesty" of science, it confines itself to the "facts." It is accordingly preoccupied with the actual behavior of men, with their actual institutions, status relations, class loyalties, hierarchical roles, voting patterns, consumer choices and so forth. And it follows that we implicitly accept as a criterion of significance the actual practices of the majority of men. "Values" are studied purely descriptively or statistically; while the content discovered to be comparatively stable in a given culture is referred to as "the normative order." And this, scientifically speaking, is the only way that we can discuss values. The normative order is what actually obtains over a wide area at a given time. God's "normative order" is simply a dimension that does not exist. A few scientists, a declining minority, might still shrink from so direct and explicit an avowal. For reasons of prudence or caution, they sometimes suggest that they are not theologians, that *qua* scientists they are not competent to pronounce upon such questions as "absolute values." But their practice affirms their genuine belief that God, if He ever did exist, does so no longer; that God was abolished when man entered upon the positivist stage of his evolution.

My metaphysical presuppositions in this essay are very simple, and may be stated in the form of a familiar antithesis: The kingdom of this world is the kingdom of power, whereas the kingdom of God is animated solely by love. It is, accordingly, the duty of each of us to do what he can to transform the former into the latter. My concern here is not to argue this fundamental metaphysical issue but to take an example of how it is treated by contemporary value-free social science. I accordingly turned to a recent work by a leading sociologist, Prof. Talcott Parsons, who has chapters entitled "On the Concept of Political Power" and on "Christianity." The following brief quotes must suffice to indicate the style of treatment. Power is defined: "Power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions—whatever the actual agency of that enforcement." When rendered into plain English, this might be supposed to mean: "Power means being compelled to do what you ought to do by those who also define what you ought to do." But we would be mistaken if we supposed this to be the meaning, for the author continues: "It will be noted that I have used the conceptions of generalization and of legitimation in defining power. . . . By my definition securing compliance with a wish, whether it be defined as an obligation of the object or not, simply by threat of superior force, is not an exercise of power." (*Sociological Theory and*

*Modern Society*, 1967, p. 308.) In short, if someone by pointing a loaded gun at your head simply compels you to "stand and deliver," this is not an instance of "power." In this way, the reader is thrown into a state of mystification and confusion at the very outset of the discussion. The ordinary everyday logic of common sense is stood on its head, and the whole crucial question of what, if anything, can legitimize power, is begged. And it is difficult to believe that that was not the actual intention.

Turning to the discussion of Christianity, we are met at the outset with this disavowal: "The ethical component which is so prominent in Christianity generally" takes the form of "altruistic love, of pure personal selfless acts of love by individuals." The author continues: "In this discussion I would like to differentiate this form of altruism from the institutionalization of Christian ethics to become part of the structure of the society itself. It is the latter with which my analysis will be concerned." (*Ibid.*, p.388.) And so the real issue posed by the teaching of Jesus: how can an individual obey the will of God that he should love his neighbor as himself, when he is taught that it is his duty to obey "Authority" resting on armed violence, is never permitted to emerge. It is precisely the institutionalization of Christianity that led inevitably to the compromise with powerful institutions, with which the early Christians' refusal to compromise had constituted the secret of their unique strength. To announce in a lecture on Christianity that you intend to confine yourself to its institutionalization is analogous to a lecturer on the cow declaring that he will confine himself to roast beef.


The truth of the matter is that the new generation, from which the students are drawn, can see clearly enough that the world directed by their elders, themselves burdened by an evil past legacy, is headed for disaster. They naturally feel an urgent need to understand the causes of what has gone wrong, and a very human and laudable desire to mitigate the terrible suffering which has ensued—particularly for people in Vietnam, Biafra, Algeria, Palestine, Latin America, South Africa, but also for the hosts of poor and deprived people in the Western industrial heartlands themselves. As the natural sciences offer them no means of understanding what are essentially human problems, as these disciplines are indeed directly implicated in the production of some of the worst evils from which escape is sought (atomic weapons, biological, chemical warfare), students increasingly seek entry into the frequently overcrowded lecture halls and libraries of the humanities and social sciences. What then must be their frustration and disillusion when all too frequently they are proffered, in the name of science, not ruthlessly honest analysis of existing social evils but a framework in which problems are defined in terms of the existing culture whose presuppositions are never called in question? Moreover, the presuppositions never can be called in question, since to do so is to be ruled out of order on the ground that one is appealing to a metaphysical dimension of experience, the existence of which is excluded by the rules of positivistic science.

"Man," wrote William Blake, "must and will have some Religion: if he has not the Religion of Jesus, he will have

the Religion of Satan and will erect the Synagogue of Satan, calling the Prince of this World, God, destroying all who do not worship Satan under the Name of God." We have neglected this truth at our ever increasing peril; and today as a consequence the young are in open revolt, openly contemptuous of the values of their elders. Our universities are temples of science, not true, humanly oriented and concerned science but science perverted to the service of false values. The young feel a keen sense of frustration and anger, knowing something is radically wrong, but confused and unsure as to the correct diagnosis of the malaise. They have inherited a cultural world in which they are being suffocated from an almost total absence of spiritual or religious truth, as it was understood and acted upon by men like Bunyan and Richardson and Blake, Schiller, Proudhon and Tolstoy.

By which I am far from meaning a reversion to a mystical view of life, but a rational view of the unity and equality of all men, bound to the universe out of which they emerge and to which they return in a common way. We urgently need a renewal of a common purpose based on an authentic religious vision of the true nature and role of knowledge in the service of the community, where the university is seen as a genuine means of transmitting the best in our cultural heritage to the next generation. It was well enough to begin with Newman. But Newman will no longer serve as a sufficient touchstone. His view of the universe of knowledge, profound though it was, rested on a religious revelation which accepted without criticism the notion that God intervened directly in human affairs in such "historically authenticated" events as the Flood, as well as on equally irrational but more grave aberrations in the "normative order" ranging from "the just war" to the legitimacy of privilege and elitism.

The difficulty with Newman's idea of a university was that it never succeeded in escaping from a contradiction which beset and continues to beset the surrounding culture which nurtures the university. I refer to the acceptance and simultaneous rejection of the idea of equality. On the one hand, the university is rightly defined as "an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill." The principle of equality and reciprocity is thus regarded as axiomatic for all those within the university. On the other hand, Newman makes it quite plain, as he distinguishes the function of a "liberal education" from mere technical or vocational instruction, that he conceives the central role of the university as being to select and train a supposedly natural elite, scheduled to undertake the governing responsibilities of tomorrow. A democrat *inside* the university, Newman is the bluest of blue-blooded aristocrats as soon as he emerges from the rarefied air of the academic cloister into the distinctly more fetid atmosphere of the market place. And in Europe, at any rate, we have never succeeded in overcoming this evil legacy, this dreadful superstition that while humanity at large may be fitted for primary and even secondary education, it is certainly not competent, by nature, to undertake the esoteric mysteries of a higher education. And it is this assumption that powerfully colors, shapes and distorts the content and organization of virtually all university teaching.



Pierre, Aux Eclouses (Paris)

The existing situation, although possibly trembling on the verge of necessary revolutionary changes, is still not vitally different from the situation vividly caught and impressed upon the imagination by Thomas Hardy in 1895. Jude Fawley, a stonemason by trade, like many before him had allowed his imagination to be captivated by the romantic vision of Oxford's "dreaming spires" and "the streets where the great men go." Poor Jude! Of the reality behind the façade he had no idea, and naturally assumed that "Christminster" was an indispensable gateway through which all aspirants to knowledge and learning must pass. He accordingly had the temerity to apply for admission; and one head of house, the Master of Biblioll, was courteous enough to reply: "... judging from your description of yourself as a working-man, I venture to think that you will have a much better chance of success in life by remaining in your own sphere and sticking to your trade than by adopting any other course." The direct connection between the class structure and educational provision was self-evident to the Master of Biblioll, and he saw no reason for beating about the bush. Stonemasons do not go to universities—as they are still conceived—unless it is to learn how to equip themselves for some form of managerial role incompatible with any further deployment of a manual skill. The university which teaches intellectuals to be "stonemasons" and "stonemasons" to be intellectuals, in short to rear the whole man instead of a mutilated half man, does not yet exist. The role of the

universities is still to select out and equip an elite which will govern and administer tomorrow's generation and refurbish a supply of future leaders. And since this is the essential inegalitarian function of the university, however much it talks of equality within the university, however much it boasts of a value-free, scientific pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, its entire curricula, its organization of the corpus of knowledge, its selection of significant teaching material, its teaching methods cannot fail to be influenced by the elitist, inegalitarian premise.

The truth is that the claim of positivist neutrality, of being bound only by the "facts," has always been bogus. In order to carve out any subject, in order to pursue any discipline, give a lecture or write a book, subjects, topics, facts, contexts must be selected or chaos will follow. Since selection involves omission, it automatically endows that which is selected with tacit significance or value. If the criteria of significance or value do not flow spontaneously from a sincere love of and desire to serve humanity, and especially suffering humanity, the decisive, animating values will necessarily be dictated either by the idle curiosity of the bored and privileged, or by the desire to ingratiate the powerful and dispensers of patronage, or at the very least not to offend them. Selection and treatment of subjects is a matter of great importance. If the motivation of the interest is not determined by a love of significant knowledge, where significance is related to actual human problems, it must flow from a love of self, with an appetite for distraction, promotion or prestige. And those who dispense promotion and prestige, research grants and publication subsidies will assuredly not dispense them readily, if at all, to those whose work is motivated by the desire to reduce the world's inequalities in the interests of justice.

When science devotes itself to methods of resolving conflicts within a larger social framework of domination and injustice; when it engages in "pacification" experiments in Vietnam or Camelot projects in Latin America; when it collaborates in state "defence" projects; when it measures IQs for hierarchical or promotional grading purposes, neutrality is seen for what it is, a mask which conceals the features of power. Science in our culture has come more and more to prostitute its prodigious talents to the service of power, with frightening consequences to mankind. When science seeks to grow a human fetus in artificial laboratory conditions or experiments with animals to produce monsters, to cite recent examples, we may well feel that the limits of perversion are being reached. Certainly the agency which provides work for idle hands to do is well known. The demand that is increasingly being heard that all scientists and engineers, social as well as physical, should be asked to take some kind of Hippocratic oath may not admit of formal fulfillment; but it is a long-awaited sign of a rising awareness that all workers, and especially scientists, need to dedicate their work and talents by the light of a true metaphysic. A true metaphysic makes explicit the human obligation to mitigate and reduce suffering, to strengthen the unity and freedom of mankind—without violence—in a world surfeited and nauseated by violence.

# ALBANIAN DEMONOLOGY

ANNE TUCKERMAN

At a time when Washington and Moscow are moving closer together in fields of common interest, and when any progress in this direction is hailed by many in the United Nations as a promise of a more stable world, a voice of dissent is heard to denounce this development as a "collusion of imperialists bound on dominating the world and dividing it between them."

Albania has been a member of the United Nations since 1955 and, in the absence of Peking, is usually referred to as "the voice of China"; indeed the People's Republic of China has no stauncher defender or supporter in the world organization. But in this twenty-fifth year of Albania's liberation—proclaimed a jubilee year by its Communist leader, Enver Hoxha—its representatives sound most of all like spokesmen of the Stalin era. In a time when ideology plays a steadily dwindling role in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, little Albania—a country scarcely larger than Maryland—stands as the self-proclaimed guardian of the purity of "Marxist-Leninist" doctrine of world revolution and class struggle. On the basis of common ideology, Albania has found a powerful friend in the Chinese leadership, with which it has signed numerous trade agreements. From China, it receives large credit aid, interest free, for its development plans, especially the present five-year plan designed to advance the country's industrialization and mechanization of agriculture.

At the same time, Albania has trade relations with a number of West European countries and is steadily lifting itself out of its prewar and immediate postwar status of underdevelopment. According to official statistics, Albania's industrial production, supported by large mineral resources and oil deposits, has increased fifty-five times since 1938, and the electrification of all its villages is predicted by 1971. More than 80 per cent of the populace was illiterate in 1938; now almost every Albanian under the age of 55 is literate, and one-fourth of the 2 million people attend school.

Descendants of the ancient Illyrians, the people of Albania call their country Shqipëria which means "the land of the eagle." Under Turkish rule for 500 years until 1912, they are intensely patriotic and their leaders are supremely confident of the country's future and the stability of the regime, despite the isolation in which Albania stands since the break with the Soviet Union in 1961 over Nikita Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence and his relations with China.

Following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, Albania renounced its formal membership in the Warsaw Pact and received reassurances from the Chinese leaders that "they would stand in all circumstances steadfastly at the side of the fraternal Albanian people"; and that, "if the American imperialists, the modern Soviet revisionists and their servants dare to touch even a single hair of

Albania, they can only expect a shameful, total and inevitable defeat." This pledge of assistance is welcomed by the Albanians, but they claim that, even without it, their survival in their present position is assured because military aggression would be very costly for any attacker, Albania being militarily well prepared and its fiercely independent population being determined to resist.

On the other hand, a disguised intervention would not work, Albanian officials say, in a country where the Communist party has remained completely monolithic and "ideologically pure," unsullied by the "revisionist" tendencies which have attacked the core of the party leadership and cadres in the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe. At the same time, Albania reproaches the Czechoslovak Government and people for their lack of armed resistance to the Soviet occupation.

From their elevated moral position, the UN representatives of Albania see major political events as a race between the two superpowers aimed at world domination. Thus Mr. Halim Budo, the deputy foreign minister of Albania, denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact forces as "an act of Fascist-like banditry," but also noted that American outcries at the new rape of Czechoslovakia were not followed by any action, and that American representatives benevolently and significantly "forgot" the deed.

In Vietnam, Mr. Budo sees the United States continuing its "imperialist aggression," with the complicity of the Soviet Union, which "preaches shameful capitulation to North Vietnam to reward American imperialism for its tacit approval of their aggression in Czechoslovakia." Concerning the Middle East, Mr. Budo remarked that "the Glassboro meeting between Johnson and Kosygin took place on the very day after the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries," and that the Soviet Union, while pretending to assist the Arab peoples, failed to help them in the war, and is now trying "to trick them into negotiations." The Russians, he added, "are conniving with the American imperialists to put a brake on the revolutionary impetus of the Arab peoples," while the navies of the two powers in the Mediterranean "are the watchdogs to insure the successful execution of these plans."

In Latin America, "the Soviet revisionists and their local lackeys advocate coexistence with the cliques in power, while American imperialism strikes with weapons of war against the revolution which bubbles everywhere." The United Nations itself, in the eyes of the Albanians, is "dominated by the imperialists of the United States and the Soviet Union up to the top floor of the glass palace" (where Secretary-General U Thant has his office, and is blamed for his appeals in favor of big-power diplomacy.)

For the analysts in Tirana, the natural target of this "great conspiracy" is the People's Republic of China, which "represents the most powerful obstacle to the plans for counterrevolution and world hegemony." The recent Soviet-Chinese clashes on the Ussuri River are, in their view, the result of Soviet provocations, with the acquies-

cence of Washington, in order to increase tension at the Chinese border, while providing an excuse for Moscow to "let down" its East German ally in the latest Berlin crisis, and diverting attention from difficulties in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union itself. On the other hand, the Russian overtures to Peking are seen as propaganda in preparation for an all-Communist Party Congress.

Albania is not alone in thinking that the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons "tends in fact to consolidate the nuclear monopoly of the two superpowers by forcing the nonatomic countries to recognize this monopoly and to accept a 'protected' status"; but it also sees the treaty as part of a strategic encirclement of China, "by offering a nuclear umbrella to India, which has put itself in tow with the imperialists."

Naturally, the current plans for the construction of an ABM "Sentinel" or "Safeguard" system, directed mainly against China, and the astute indiscretion of President Nixon to the effect that Moscow has added to its Western-oriented radar an Eastern-oriented one brings Albanian demonology closer to reality. The willing cooperation of the Soviet navy in the search for survivors of the spy plane downed off the North Korean coast was eloquent evidence in this direction. In their theoretical analysis of this "conspiracy," the Albanian Marxists find that innumerable "contradictions" have been added to the "inherent contradictions of the capitalist system." "Not only does the increasing collaboration of the zone of the dollar and the zone of the ruble produce another big element in the world capitalist competition, with accompanying political crises and tensions," says Party Secretary Enver Hoxha, "but the alliance itself, aiming at determining zones of influence for the two partners, does not exclude blows and counterblows to each other, when contradictions between them reach their climax."

Albania, however, does not accept the view that the *Götterdämmerung* it predicts for the unholy alliance might reflect the contradictions of the Communist, as well as the capitalist, system, or that "revisionism" might be the ineluctable consequence of a more affluent society in Socialist countries. It ascribes the "degenerescence of Soviet revisionism" solely to the abandonment by Khrushchev and his successors of the concept of world revolu-

tion, and the creation of a new class of bureaucrats and technocrats. This double "treason," which the Albanians condemn with the particular emotional hatred felt by those who once revered the Soviet Union, results, in their view, from a basic "mistake" in the education of the Communist cadres, which became alienated from the rest of the people and thus subject to "revisionism" and the rekindling of bourgeois mentality. They see similar developments in the other Socialist countries, each one following a distinct pattern according to its past history and traditions. Moreover, they think that the "exploiting nature" of Soviet hegemony contributed to counterrevolutionary trends. They make an exception for Romania, because the Romanian leaders are resisting Soviet domination, and probably also because they chart a cautious course between Moscow and Peking.

The Albanian leadership is determined not to repeat the "mistakes" of the Soviet Union and is convinced that it can succeed by means of a vast program of popular education, wherein the students of all ages and both sexes combine academic and strongly ideological instruction with work contributing directly to national production. They have also instituted a salary scale that places technicians, intellectuals and government officials in the same brackets as workers and farmers. These practices are similar to much in the Chinese system but, unlike China, Albania has no communes, seeing no need for them in so small a country. Tirana tries to magnify its ideological role in the Communist world by serving as publishing house for Marxist-Leninist literature in all languages and broadcasting political programs through one of the most powerful transmitters in Europe.

The Albanian leaders accept no compromise and foresee a long and violent struggle to "eradicate" bourgeois tendencies at home and imperialism abroad. In this, they consider as their natural allies the "liberation movements" in the developing countries, the youth revolt against the Establishment, and black militancy in the United States. They predict also that the people in "decadent" Socialist countries will rise in a new revolution of the Left. The Albanians see themselves as priests of the true faith, and they are convinced that together with the new forces they can build a "new world," and a "new man."

## FRATRICIDE IN THE SIERRA CLUB

**ROBERT A. JONES**

*Mr. Jones is on the editorial staff of the San Francisco Bay Guardian.*

*San Francisco*

I first heard of David Brower in the early 1960s. I was supposed to be restacking picture books in a college library in New York, but most of the time I thumbed idly through their pages. I sat down, safely buried in the long rows of stacks, and picked up a large picture book called *The Eloquent Light*. I went through the book once, then

again. The photographs of the Sierra Nevada had been taken by a man named Ansel Adams and edited by David Brower at the Sierra Club. I had heard of neither the man nor the Sierra Club, and for a few months the book was a secret.

Then one day I saw *The Eloquent Light* in a college bookstore, and soon it was in every bookstore. The design, the beauty of the photographs, the plea for the preservation of the land the photographs described were contagious. The book, and others that followed it, were expensive, but for every person who bought the book, at least a hundred must have read it in the store. After sev-

eral black-and-white books, the Sierra Club began publishing in color. Then posters appeared, huge things with color reprints from the books; then paperbacks; then wall calendars; then stationery. It seemed, by 1968, that the Sierra Club had a talent second only to *Peanuts* for glutting the bookstore market. Behind them all was the name of David Brower.

In San Francisco, seven years after I saw *The Eloquent Light*, I watched Brower and Adams at a Sierra Club board meeting in October 1968. Brower sat at one end of a long directors' table, his head bent over almost to his knees and moving slowly back and forth. At the table, Ansel Adams was demanding that Brower be fired as executive director of the Sierra Club.

In the years between the first publishing of *The Eloquent Light* and the confrontation at the board meeting, the Sierra Club had become a particular success. After he was appointed the club's executive director in 1952, Brower began, slowly at first, to promulgate the club's conservationist-preservationist ideas through books. He was, after all, a former editor of the University of California Press. The idea was new to conservation and, at the first try, it worked with a book in 1954 titled *This Is Dinosaur*, a plea for the establishment of Dinosaur National Monument. But outside California the club remained relatively unknown until the publishing of *The Eloquent Light* began the series of large-format picture books in 1960.

Brower had managed to move conservation from garden clubs to the college campus and to large-scale publishing; in doing so he was to catch the scent of the sixties. Many of the thousands of volunteers the club attracted to testify at government hearings and to stuff envelopes and to write letters to Congressmen had first learned of the club from seeing its books in their college bookstores. Brower's use of the books, his films, and his promotion advertising appealed to the growing activism of the decade, and his outrage at the rape of the land by big government and big business dovetailed nicely with its morality.

By 1966 the club had become large, powerful, but unwieldy. Using full-page advertisements in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*, the *San Francisco Chronicle* and other newspapers, it had led, and would soon win, campaigns for a Redwood National Park and a North Cascade National Park. Fighting back from the destruction of Glen Canyon, flooded by the Army Corps of Engineers, it prevented a similar dam in the Grand Canyon. Although the club, and all conservationists, were still losing more bouts than they were winning, the gap was closing. After the Redwood National Park was gerrymandered by the logging companies of Northern California, the Arcata Redwood Company, one of the largest, announced that it would go out of business in five years. "But didn't you manage to keep most of your land out of the park?" asked a member of the press. "Do you really believe Brower's people won't come back next year and get it all?" the company official shot back.

But as the Sierra Club grew it became infinitely difficult to manage. It was a hybrid of the professional and the amateur, and the path of a conservation idea from birth to execution led from committee to committee to

board of directors to president to executive director. Sometimes ideas could be lost for years. One of Brower's last schemes for the club, a book series dealing with international environment problems, was originally proposed five years before the first book was published.

To compound the difficulties, the two segments of the club had grown suspicious of each other's power. The volunteer and amateur board of directors ceaselessly reminded the professional Brower that he had been hired only to execute their policies, not to create policies of his own. Brower would shrug consent, return to work, and ignore the pleas of the board.

Brower's drive to innovate, to change, to surprise, and to do it all quickly could not be held in check by the board. When one club publication, the *Sierra Club Bulletin*, was taken from his control, he invented another, the *Sierra Club Explorer*. When he believed that club procedure would interfere with the timing of a \$20,000 advertisement in *The New York Times*, he ignored protocol and bought the advertisement in secret. "They want," he said with disdain, "to run this place like a bank."

As Brower's plans for the future increased, so did the apprehensions of other leaders of the club. One of the board members told me: "There's a recklessness to Dave that's terrifying. It's like driving down a city street with a man who's going 90 miles an hour. For a couple of blocks you may be O.K., but pretty soon you're gonna hit something. Well, that scares the hell out of me. But you know what? I think Dave likes it."

Those who opposed Brower were, above all, reasonable men. They are doctors and lawyers from San Francisco's financial district, scientists from Berkeley and a judge from Oakland, men who have lived their lives in the spirit of compromise, not confrontation. They are men who ask, "How much does it cost?" and "How much will it buy?" They would never have created the exciting and compelling picture but neither would they bankrupt the club. They were not young men, they did not burn with Brower's self-righteous fire; they were careful, sure and sophisticated.

Members like Richard Leonard, a San Francisco corporate lawyer, Paul Brooks, vice president of Houghton Mifflin in Boston, or Edgar Wayburn, a San Francisco doctor, could not understand a man whose publishing program had lost almost \$300,000 and who yet proposed to expand it in such a way that it would lose millions. They admitted that they feared a man who could propose not only the expanded book program but a television series, film documentaries and advertising campaigns.

For Brower, the plans for the future of the Sierra Club were like a vision, and his confidence in his own abilities to bring it off approached religious faith. Once I spent an afternoon discussing the vision with him, and his enthusiasm was so contagious that I left feeling that it could all very well happen.

The vision was a complex, coordinated network of conservation propaganda that would, Brower felt, eventually equal the propaganda of the dam builders, the loggers, the highway engineers, and the infinite variety of their species. The books would discuss not only the problems of the United States but of the whole world. (The unauthorized

*New York Times* advertisement proposed an "Earth National Park.") The movements and plans of business and governments would be watched by teams of field representatives that could also coordinate local resistance. Brower had already approached Time-Life, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Xerox, and other large corporations to help finance television documentaries, and movie-house shorts on crises that could not wait for books. Brower's contact with the corporations termed their reaction "very enthusiastic."

Not even the most conservative members of the club's board could help but feel the temptation of such a vision. The power and glory that it would bring were titillating. But the old jealousies prevailed. What, they asked, would happen to the volunteers in such a program? William Siri, a member of the American Mount Everest expedition and club director, said: "We believe what Brower is doing, whether it makes money or not, is heading the club toward disaster. Brower's ideas leave no place for the amateur, and the Sierra Club is unique because it is an amateur, a volunteer organization."

When the attack was mounted against the vision, Brower was impaled on charges other than his threat to the amateurs. Obviously believing that personal charges against Brower would be more effective than attacks on his ideas, his enemies gathered an impressive list of misuse of funds. The most serious, they said, occurred in 1968 when Brower signed contracts that would have paid him 10 per cent of the 8 per cent total royalties from three Sierra Club books. The leaders of the club, all once close friends, had seen their mutual respect and shared concern deteriorate to such an extent that they could now only shout at one another in rage. The following accounts of a closed meeting has been verified by several directors:

*President Edgar Wayburn:* Dave, the chairman of the Legal Committee reports to me that . . . to his surprise he finds that 10 per cent of the gross royalty is to you. What is your explanation?

*Brower:* The royalty is for creativity. It takes a great deal of skill to make those books as successful as they have been.

*Wayburn:* Well, you are paid for that. It is part of your job.

*Brower:* I am not paid for it! I am badly underpaid.

*Wayburn:* Your action is unilateral. Neither the president nor the board of directors has heard of this. Mr. Treasurer, were you consulted?

*Treasurer:* No.

*Wayburn:* I agree that salary readjustments for fine work should be . . . reviewed frequently, but that is an entirely different matter from this unilateral action.

*Brower:* It is not extra pay! Every one of those royalty checks will be paid back to the Sierra Club.

*Director Richard Leonard:* But then you are going in a circle. If the Sierra Club pays it to you and you pay it back, what is the purpose?

*Brower:* The purpose is to provide a discretionary fund for the use of the executive director.

*Treasurer:* But you already have a discretionary fund of \$25,000. . . .

THE NATION/May 5, 1969

Brower reacted furiously to the attack. He counter-charged that Wayburn and Leonard were jealous of his talents and success, and even hinted that they might be in the pay of the lumber companies or big utilities.

Neither side would recognize how badly they needed the other. The doctors and lawyers needed, and would always need, the ideas and the style of a man like Brower. Instead of making that admission, they rationalized that a "time for a change" had come within the club. Maynard Munger, a long-time club leader in Oakland, even theorized on the club's development: "From 1952, when Dave took over, until now, the club has been a charismatic organization. It operated on the spirit and impetus of one man. But now, in order to return the club to the idea on



which it was founded, that is, a volunteer club, it must become a rational organization, and the charisma of the one-man leadership must disappear."

Blind as the opposition directors were to their needs, Brower was worse. As a visionary he could not accept serious criticism, and as the administrative conservation leader he could not accept even a small defeat by the board. In the modern corporate life, when every presiding genius needs a good accountant behind him, Brower's greatest failing was his refusal to be financially controlled. Films and books were contracted for that no one but Brower had considered. Donations were made to other organizations without explanation. When the club feared revocation of its tax-exempt status because of its legislative activities, it formed a separate Sierra Club Foundation, also tax exempt, to minimize the loss. Because he failed to consult the club's own legal advisers, Brower later jeopardized this safety move by including the foundation's name in a strongly worded advertisement that appeared in *The New York Times*.

Throughout the battle, which lasted for more than three years, there were few differences between Brower and his opponents over conservation policy itself. Although his opponents feared that Brower's vision might eventually run the club to bankruptcy, none of them questioned its potential scope or power. And Brower, who reminds re-

porters that he "was a volunteer for almost twenty years," claimed he had always supported the volunteer phases of the club.

But the battle had become a personal one between proud men, none of whom could lose gracefully. In January, when Brower placed a \$20,000 advertisement in *The New York Times* without approval from the board or the president of the club, he was both precipitating a crisis that would leave no hope of compromise and rallying his supporters. When Wayburn suspended him the next day, the dare had been taken. The coming elections of the board of directors would decide whether Brower would rule with almost no support from thousands of Sierra Club volunteers, or whether the volunteers would control an organization deprived of the directing skill that had made it famous.

Because Brower's campaign within the club carried the same self-righteous tone that characterized his campaigns against government and business, and because the accumulated charges against his years of free spending could not be well defended, Brower lost badly. Of five positions open on the board, Brower lost all five to men who vehemently opposed him. The day after the election results were announced, I called Richard Leonard, a director of the opposition, and asked him what he thought would be done with Brower. "Dave Brower," he said, "will be fired

at the May 3 meeting of the board of directors for his gross crimes against the Sierra Club."

What will thus be lost is not so much the "policies" of David Brower as the spirit he infused into the offices of the club. Maynard Munger's prediction will have become a fact: the Sierra Club will cease to be a charismatic organization and will become a rational one, but to have rationality at the total expense of vision and drive is a tragedy that should never have happened.

When the press writes of the Sierra Club, it usually feels an obligation to tack an adjective ahead of its name, as "prestigious" or "abrasive" or just "powerful." The Sierra Club, throughout its history, has not always been granted such respect and the question is whether it will continue to do so now. It will not become, as Brower predicts, a "hiking club." It will remain extremely active. But much more than activity is required to maintain an institution that fights for the faith and ideals of many people. The press rarely refers to an "abrasive" Audubon Society or a "powerful" Izaak Walton League.

The real question is whether the club will be able to sustain the force and clarity, the feeling of being so recklessly right in spite of all odds that Brower gave it. The men who won the election seem willing to chance it. But to those who snuck back in the stacks for one more look at *The Eloquent Light*, the odds seem long.

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## ERNEST GRUENING

**I**t is, and for some time has been, obvious that the most important issue facing our nation is to get out of the war in Southeast Asia. All our other issues and problems are slighted, impaired and unresolved until we halt the fighting, stop the concomitant continuing drain of blood and treasure, and turn to the long-neglected and pressing needs at home.

During his election campaign Richard Nixon told the American people that he had a plan to end the war, but did not want to disclose it for fear of interfering with the negotiations in Paris. After three months in office President Nixon gives us no indication of any formula or proposal for achieving that widely desired objective.

On the contrary, draft calls are undiminished, casualties mount and we continue, as we have for the last five years, to be winning the war only in the optimistic pronouncements of our military leaders and their supporting newspaper columnists. The President has shown a commendable restraint in not re-escalating the battlefield activity, having no doubt learned that every time our military propose just one more upmanship we get in that much deeper. But the prospect is for continued warfare.

A new approach is desperately needed, and I offer it in the fervent hope that President Nixon who, I doubt not, would like to rid his Administration of the albatross

bequeathed him by President Johnson, will lay aside his preconceptions and the assumptions that have underlain our policies to date. For that purpose a review of what has happened is appropriate.

Five years ago, on March 10, 1964, I delivered the first major opposition speech on this issue made in Congress. It was entitled, "The United States Should Get Out of Vietnam." With exhibits, it occupied 30 pages in the *Congressional Record*. It would have been easy for President Johnson to accept that counsel and to withdraw at that time, since no United States units had been committed to combat, and the casualties had been very few.

The opening sentence of that March 10 address was: "The mess in Vietnam was inherited by President Johnson." That holds true for President Nixon today; he is under no more obligation than was President Johnson to perpetuate his predecessor's policies.

That we have lost some 34,000 young Americans killed in action, several thousand more through other causes, more than a quarter of a million wounded, some horribly crippled for life, have killed tens of thousands of innocent noncombatants, created more than a million homeless refugees, sunk in excess of \$125 billion unrecoverably in the Asian quagmire, and sacrificed our moral standards before the conscience of mankind, does not lessen

but increases the need for an alternative course. To continue to permit our men to die in vain—as they all have died in this war—is not short of criminal.

The extent of our folly, despite official propaganda and the ever optimistic and misleading reports of military and diplomatic experts in the scene, has dawned increasingly on the American people. The desire and need to disentangle ourselves have been widely expressed, and as widely countered with the hopeless and unimaginative retort: "Well, maybe we shouldn't have gone in but we're *there* now," with the accent on the "there," implying that we have to keep on with what we have been doing.

More recently, this has been refined by acknowledgments that, while we must find a way out, it must be an "honorable" way—which can be translated to mean victory for our position. The "unthinkable" proposal that we withdraw unilaterally (why not, since we barged in unilaterally and in violation of all our treaty commitments?) is met with the loaded cliché, "You wouldn't scuttle and run, would you?" I'll examine that in a moment.

Let me urge that *any* way out would be more honorable than to continue the needless slaughter, and the ever deepening submergence of our nation's interests and values. But actually the most honorable way out would be to repudiate the whole dishonorable episode (made even more demonstrably so, since the Fulbright committee hearings last year revealed that the Tonkin Gulf incident was spurious), to make an "agonizing reappraisal" and confess error.

Defense Secretary Laird has recently revived the shopworn proposal that we strengthen the South Vietnamese army and turn the war over to it—Congress to appropriate additional millions of dollars for that purpose. This would mean merely further subsidy to the corrupt and dictatorial Saigon regimes which have been successively

self-imposed by military coups or by electoral fraud, thereby justifying the struggles of the anti-Communist opposition, as well as of the Vietcong against puppet regimes which have no popular support and are maintained solely by American armed might and financial aid.

On February 26 of last year, addressing the Senate shortly after the rigged South Vietnamese elections and the sentencing to years at hard labor of the defeated non-Communist opponents of the Thieu-Ky ticket (it was as if President Nixon after his victory had ordered Mr. Johnson and Mr. Humphrey to the chain gang!), I made a specific recommendation to the President. It appeared in the *Congressional Record* under the heading, "One Possible Solution to the Vietnam Dilemma," and follows:


*Recommendations for extrication of the United States from its Vietnamese folly are not the responsibility of those who for years have dissented from United States policy in Vietnam. It is the responsibility of those who got us into the Southeast Asia mess.*

*However, if President Johnson really wants to get the United States out of the morass in Vietnam, and save us from ever-mounting and ever-deepening disaster and the increasing slaughter of the flower of our youth and of thousands of Vietnamese noncombatants, his opportunity is here and now.*

*He could go on nationwide radio and television and, in effect, say to the American people:*

My fellow citizens, I have tried for four years and my predecessors have tried for a decade previously to bring a semblance of self-government and democracy to the people of South Vietnam. It has become clear beyond peradventure that it is not their desire, and that the United States, despite its prodigious efforts in manpower and money, and the sacrifice of thousands of American lives, cannot achieve these desired results for them.

I have today ordered the unconditional cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam and of all offensive



Trog, London Daily Mail

"I Sure Hope They Find Another Way of Doing It."

operations in South Vietnam. In addition, I have directed there be an immediate in-place cease-fire in South Vietnam on the part of the United States and I have requested the South Vietnamese Armed Forces to do likewise, with only defensive action authorized. I have called upon the forces of the National Liberation Front and of North Vietnam in South Vietnam to do the same. It is my purpose, which I now declare, to initiate a phased military withdrawal which should be completed within a year. In the meantime, behind the shield of American military forces with the leverage afforded by U.S. military and economic aid, U.S. representatives in South Vietnam will insist that the Thieu-Ky government broaden the base of its government to include their non-Communist opponents, represented in large measure by those whom they have now jailed and put in protective custody, and that this broadened South Vietnamese Government begin immediate negotiations with the National Liberation Front so that all these Vietnamese components can work out their own destinies.

In addition, I have directed our Ambassador to the United Nations to work with other nations there to find places of refuge in other lands for those who would not want to live in South Vietnam under the new regime which will be formed and I will ask the Congress for such additional authority as may be needed to admit such refugees to the United States and to assist in their resettlement elsewhere.

Further, I have instructed our Ambassadors to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Canada, India and Poland to propose a greatly strengthened International Control Commission to supervise any elections to be held in South Vietnam to obtain an expression of the people's will.

The United States will assist in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the burned villages, destroyed buildings and defoliated fields, and give suitable fiscal assistance to economic development. But our military efforts will cease. We will make every effort to assist the people of both North and South Vietnam to establish whatever form of government they can develop.

*Here lies a solution which both Americans and Vietnamese, I am confident, will welcome.*

This proposal in substance—with a few minor emendations because of changed conditions and its enunciation by a different President—is as valid for President Nixon today as when I proposed it to President Johnson fourteen months ago. President Johnson, of course, turned a deaf ear to it as to all other proposals for U.S. extrication. Instead, he extricated himself by announcing his withdrawal from office, a move which averted his certain defeat at the November elections.

This withdrawal was a confession of error even if he could not bring himself to admit such. He was lucky to have escaped impeachment proceedings which might have been his not undeserved fate, because of his betrayal of his campaign pledges, but was never a possibility because a supine Congress with its Democratic majority was a *supine Congress* in the whole Southeast Asian affair.

Johnson's withdrawal, however, diminished the tension at home and allayed the mounting opposition to the war based on the hope that the "peace talks" in Paris could bring peace. This is an utterly vain hope because the premises of the two adversaries are diametrically opposed and irreconcilable. We have proceeded on the premise

that we are there to repel aggression. Our adversaries maintain that the United States is the aggressor—a view substantiated by an objective review of the facts, many of them kept from the American people. That **being so, our** adversaries will naturally insist that we withdraw from Asia and let Asians settle their own problems. I doubt whether this proposition is negotiable and that peace by negotiation will be achieved. We should ask ourselves by what right we are there; what we have to gain by maintaining that presence, and whether the price is worth the costs—human, material and spiritual—which will haunt us for generations.

As for the secondary justification for our military intrusion to Southeast Asia—we must halt communism—it should be clear by now that we are actually aiding communism; that if the rulers of Communist Russia and Communist China desire our nation's debilitation and downfall, they could not devise a policy more likely to achieve that objective than the one our country is pursuing. To date, neither the Russians nor the Chinese have committed a single soldier to combat. And if our aim was to prevent the southward expansion of mainland China we have pursued the worst possible policy: we have weakened and sought to destroy Vietnam, which has been hostile to the Chinese for centuries and would fight their aggression as it has successively fought that of the French, the Japanese and the Americans.

What would be the consequences of a unilateral American withdrawal? It would not be "scuttle and run." A phased withdrawal would require months and could be replaced by a nation-wide coalition government more responsive to the Vietnamese Nationalist aspirations.

Would there be a blood bath? One is going on now and it will continue as long as the United States clings to its present policies. We can be confident that long before our withdrawal was far advanced the few hundred corrupt Vietnamese officials would have retired to Paris or the Riviera, to enjoy in luxury and ease the fortunes they have filched from our bounty. If some thousands of others would prefer to leave Vietnam, it would pay handsomely to arrange for their relocation and sustenance, if necessary for life, in other climes. It would be far less costly and more humane than the present \$3 billion monthly military bill.

The others—the peasantry—would be absorbed and return to the life they had anticipated in the independent countries of Laos, Cambodia, and reunited Vietnam which the Geneva Agreements predicated and we had agreed to support.

President Nixon has the opportunity to end the war and end it honorably by adherence to principles upon which our nation was founded and through which it grew to greatness until a faulty leadership began to abandon them and got us into the present tragic disaster. That disaster—already great—will only be magnified and intensified unless President Nixon reverses the policy that has brought our nation to unfathomable depths. The Congress, too, has a responsibility to change its course and stop voting the military authorization and appropriations which have supported Presidential misleadership.

# BOOKS & THE ARTS

## Mailer and Amis: The New Conservatism

### MARTIN GREEN

Mr. Green is an English writer, teaching at present at Tufts University. He is the author of *Re-Appraisals: Some Commonsense Readings in American Literature*. The Problem of Boston, Mirror for Anglo-Saxons and Yeats's Blessings on von Hugel (all Norton).

This March 19, Kingsley Amis introduced himself to England in a new role: as the regular columnist of *The Daily Express*, a very Conservative, Beaverbrook paper, with a circulation of more than 4 million. He promises to "sound off" against "left-wing idiocy," such as disarmament, progressive education and the encroachments of planning. We are used to this set of opinions from him. He has long been famous for his support of American policy in Vietnam. But it still infuriates and disturbs liberal Englishmen that anyone should say such things, and that of all people it should be the author of *Lucky Jim* (1954), a book of so much human warmth and gaiety and so crisply and pungently anti-Establishment in its political implications. The author of *The Anti-Death League* (1966) sees life from the verandah of the officers' mess. His favorite characters talk in a mixture of military inarticulateness and prep-school patois, and their virtues are those of the heroes of late Evelyn Waugh, or late Hemingway. Amis is not merely conservative these days; he is perversely so, but without the perversity's being whimsical, without its admitting naughtiness, amounting to a twinkle in the eye.

Consciously or unconsciously, most Englishmen connect this political disreputableness in him with sexual delinquency; with, as middle terms, his much advertised taste for high living, for cigars and snuff and wines and clothes, and with that willingness to insult or offend that always goes with the grand style. He has long given scandal in liberal and radical groups in England, for all these things together, and the legends of his sexual escapades are recounted in significant proximity to those of his political errors, though today, even in England, no one dares draw an explicit connection between the two.

But such a connection surely does exist. It is of the kind that Norman Mailer points to in *Armies of the Night*, when he describes how different he felt

himself to be from both the academic liberals involved in the march, and the young people inspired by Paul Goodman. He locates the source of that difference in sex-and-sin. For him sex and sin are inseparable; for them there is no connection, "... sex to Mailer's idea of it was better off dirty, damned, even slavish! than clean, and without guilt. For guilt was the existential edge of sex. Without guilt, sex was meaningless." This is easily said, and easily read as just Norman, but in fact it is of enormous significance.

Nothing is more crucial to every kind of liberalism and radicalism today than the idea that sex must be made to seem innocent and clean. Of the millions who read *Armies of the Night* with enthusiasm, not one in a thousand would consider teaching his child that sex can ever be sinful. But anyone who has read *An American Dream* or "The Time of Her Time" knows how seriously Mailer means it. This is Mailer's *experience*, and if anyone's philosophy derives its validity from his experience, his does. No wonder he felt himself profoundly unlike all the other people on the march. And when he met, in Robert Lowell, another man who preferred "posh evil social affairs" ("... a party lacked flavor for him unless someone very rich or social was present") no wonder he felt they were both "*grands conservateurs*" and "*émigré* princes." They did not belong there with their liberal companions. They believed in other values. Just how conservative those are in Mailer's case became clear in *Miami and the Siege of Chicago*, where his sympathies went—wistfully, romantically—to the Nixons and the Republicans, to small-town Protestant decency, to old-style Americanism. His feelings about the Democrats, even about embattled youth, even about the blacks, were much more equivocal.

The word "conservative" brings us back to Amis. Mailer tells us that for him, "An evening without a wicked lady in the room was like an opera company without a large voice." This theme runs implicitly through all of Amis' fiction, and is central to *That Uncertain Feeling*. The problem of John Lewis, perhaps the most autobiographical of all Amis' heroes, is that for him, too, wicked ladies are more attractive than innocent ones. Elizabeth Gruffydd-Williams, who gives "posh evil social affairs," nearly breaks up his marriage with Jean, whom he likes much

better, and loves. His solution, at the book's climax, is the resolve that since he has "piloted" himself into "the position of being moral and immoral at the same time, the thing was to keep trying not to be immoral, and then to keep trying might turn into a habit." And in the final scene, he runs away from a party where he is accosted by another wicked lady, and he and his wife fade out into a montage of miners and Welsh pubs and working-class domesticity. But that was Amis' second novel, written some time ago. What has happened to him since can be summed up, *should* be summed up, by saying that he has changed his mind, has chosen the wicked lady and the posh evil social affair, and has given up innocence and his wife and socialism.

Both Amis and Mailer are then conservatives of the same kind, and this is very interesting, because the left of Center bias of our intellectual culture is getting so pronounced these days that everyone except extremists is looking anxiously for some counterbalance on the Right. (This anxiety has several sources. One, which infects even unequivocal radicals, is the fear that the reaction which must come might be utterly unprincipled and anti-intellectual.) Amis and Mailer are conservatives primarily in that they are anti-liberal, but to say this is not to dismiss them. That left of Center bias operates to make every alternative ideology, at first, only a reaction against liberalism. Amis and Mailer do not have political policies to offer which I at least find impressive, but they have a recognizable intellectual position which affords them political insights. Their point of view derives, and derives authentically, from a body of experience and from intellectual and moral virtues which we cannot afford to neglect; the experience of evil, of shame, of guilt, and the virtues of courage, and honesty and purpose. They see unpopular truths.

Their point of view also derives from, and gives voice to, a temperament; a highly sexed, highly aggressive, irritable, responsible, power-oriented, "masculine" temperament, which rarely finds expression in our intellectual culture. People of that kind wield a great deal of economic and political power in our society, but in the world of ideas a different temperament is dominant; hence the

rather ludicrous contrast between the faces and the speeches of some of our statesmen. Our own period has been marked by a resurgence of respect among the liberal and the literate for this temperament, but that respect has perhaps remained largely theoretical. With reason, indeed, for by its effects on both ideas and style, this temperament suffers from certain inherent disadvantages in the realm of the mind. It is so self-affirming that it rebels against all discipline and system.

It is even in the very greatest writers of this kind, Tolstoy and Lawrence, that the unfortunate effects of this can be seen, and more typically "masculine" writers like Hemingway and Faulkner are notoriously prone to self-parody. It is surely true of Amis and Mailer, too, that neither writes as well as he might. There are vulgarities of language in Amis, *longueurs* in Mailer, that any schoolboy could correct; and the characters and events in their fiction have glaring implausibilities and fantasy functions, which the author leaves there because he doesn't want to write as well as he could. Or only as he could; that is, "as well as" is still compatible with continually asserting his own individuality, faults and all. It is typically the liberal (asexual) mind that schools itself to write and to think only well; to assert only those qualities in itself which it approves of, and to offer simulacra of those virtues it knows it should possess.

Today perhaps more than at any time since the Renaissance, the masculine temperament, for all its defects, is itself a source of ideas. This can be seen in the work of Leslie Fiedler, for instance. The most interesting aspect of *Love and Death in the American Novel*—and it is a very interesting book—is the genesis of this cultural historiography in the personal experience behind it, the relation of the voice to the theories, the relation of the sex to the scholarship. I mean that the book doesn't ask to be taken with the same kind of seriousness as the conventional history of literature. But also that it is a reappropriation of all those books and all that learning for the proudly phallic consciousness, a reinterpretation, a reclamation of them away from all feminine-genteel, or eunuchoid-factual, versions of the past. And, above all, that this resexualizing of knowledge is offered as an intellectual enterprise of the first dignity. Surely it is only today that that could have happened.

Tolstoy and Lawrence shared this temperament in full measure. But they included also a large share of the feminine, and—perhaps because of this—they are much larger figures all round. Hemingway and Faulkner (and Evelyn

Waugh) were just as "masculine," but I cannot persuade myself that they had as much intelligence to direct on the world outside their fiction. Amis and Mailer seem to me more interesting minds. And the figure out of the past I associate them with most is Byron. It is, I think, no coincidence that Byron hit the headlines with the same flamboyance as they do. All three have been public figures, even public images, in the way most intellectuals eschew. Can one doubt that if Byron were alive he would be writing a popular column, appearing on TV, or starring in his own movies—indeed the three faces have a lot in common.

In Byron one finds the same fulgurous sexual temperament and scandalous career, the same contempt for the liberal-genteel virtues, the same aristocratic and defiant attitudes, and the same political activism as both revolutionary and conservative. "If we must have a tyrant, let him at least be a gentleman who has been bred to the business, and let us fall by the axe and not by the butcher's cleaver." He re-enacted, in the intellectual culture of his time, the career of the Napoleon he so much admired. And, to pass to literary matters, don't we find in *Don Juan* the same predilection for literary vulgarity as in Amis, and in *Childe Harold* the same rhetoric of self-dramatization as in Mailer? Above all, who loved a wicked lady—half fearfully, half hoping to be delivered from her—like Byron?

We usually think of Burke rather than Byron as the originator of 19th-century conservatism; and it is true that Byron's role was very non-ideological; also that Amis and Mailer will need a Burke to complete their 20th-century version. But it is possible that their contribution has already more ideological resonance than Byron's, just because in our age everything is sexual.

In his first column for *The Daily Express*, Amis discusses Orwell, as he did in his early Fabian pamphlet. Orwell has always been the political figure in terms of whom he defined his own position. Nowadays, of course, he sees him as "a thorn in the side of the Left." And it is true that Orwell, like Amis (and Mailer), has both left- and right-wing elements. But there is an interesting contrast between Orwell and Amis (and Mailer) in that one cannot imagine Orwell with a glamorous sexual career. His politics lacks a sexual character. His virility of mind and style is heroic, not voluptuary. And this is what has made him seem, recently, out of date. It is what irritated Mary McCarthy in her recent essay on him in *The New York Review of Books*. She could not discover his love life, even in his letters, and he

## THE SCREAMING MEEMIES

*The Screaming Meemies is a term  
For one of man's worst diseases.  
But how does he catch it? From a germ?  
A virus? Insufficient sperm?  
Nobody knows, by Jesus.*

*What does the patient do, undone  
By this infection? Must it run  
On a fixed course, or can it be  
Reversible? Its pathology  
Is marked by what stigmata? Clot,  
Bleb, canker, cyst? Or is there not  
One plainer sign, whereby to trace  
The morbid aspects of each case?*

*Well, let's see what he does: he jumps  
High as he can; does grinds and bumps;  
Sings dirty songs off-key; and whistles  
Hymns from his church's latest missals;  
He makes himself extremely nervous  
By memorizing Poems of Service.*

*Fatigue sets in at last; he crawls  
Back through a cranny in the walls  
To spend the remnant of his night  
In most unedifying fright.  
"Have mercy on him, Lord!", we pray,  
By Ember Day he'll be o. k.*

ROLFE HUMPHRIES

therefore seemed to her somehow unauthentic. She herself has done political reporting close to what Orwell did in *Homage to Catalonia*, but her authenticity as a sexual sensibility has of course been publicly demonstrated (in her fiction). To claim the same virtues without admitting the same weaknesses, without a similar self-exposure, obviously seemed to her like cheating. And Mailer's is an even more vivid case of such self-authentication. Orwell's style of personality, which for so long inspired so many politically minded Americans, is out of date, perhaps even in England. The new conservatism, the whole new range of political dissent, will derive from the more flamboyant sexuality of Amis and Mailer.

(An interesting possibility—just as a footnote—is suggested by Susan Sontag's recent reactions to her visits to North Vietnam and Cuba. She has been brilliantly lecturing the New Left and herself on their previous confusion of political with sexual radicalism, their bourgeois-individualist search for personal freedom at any cost to public values. For her, to separate the two now, and even put them in opposition to each other, could well lead her and her readers back to something much more like Orwell's style.)

THE NATION/May 5, 1969

# Father and Son Destroyers

THE CONFLICT OF GENERATIONS: The Character and Significance of Student Movements. By **Lewis S. Feuer**. Basic Books. 543 pp. \$12.50.

## KINGSLEY WIDMER

*Mr. Widmer, professor of English at San Diego State College, is the author of The Literary Rebel (Southern Illinois University Press) and of essays on student and other radical movements.*

The simple thesis of this ornate study: all student movements since the French Revolution are largely "irrational" and dominated by "demonry" because motivated by surrogate father killing. By the same logic, we could explain Lewis Feuer's quarter-million-word diatribe as motivated by surrogate son killing. But even in this, he protests too much such motifs as student desires to "emasculate" their elders; the reader becomes embarrassed at the pathos of the author's obsessions and unconscious castrating needs.

The irrationalities of the argument, which uses loose Freudian metaphors to explain away genuine grievances and to reductively sexualize complex social realities, often reaches comic excess. For example, we get, twice, the story of the student who assassinated the Austro-Hungarian Archduke in 1914. "No social scientist, of course, would suggest that Gavrilo Princip's deed was a sufficient condition for the outbreak of the First World War. Yet," this young nationalist "father-destroyer"—presented as representative student rebel—"upset the European balance of power and mind," and imposed "self-destruction on all Europe and most of the world," creating a "nightmare which has not yet lifted."

Professor Feuer's study claims to be sociology rather than history, in spite of its redundant summaries of other histories of student movements. It seeks jargonish legitimacy ("studentry," "intelligarchy," "juvenocracy") and includes charts of suicide rates to ostensibly prove that all student strife unconsciously furthers "suicidalism." More practically, it centers on the Berkeley Free Speech Movement of 1964 and its parallels and aftermath. The author, an active opponent of the movement at that time, here retaliates for the considerable contempt of many of his students and colleagues in his former university by nasty footnotes and such conclusions as that after the rebellion the "moral level of the University of California became the lowest in the history of American education among both the students and the faculty."

Even if we ignore the personal motiva-

tions which dominate so much of this ostensible social-psychological history of student movements, the turning of student nobility, however wise, tragic or foolish, into catalogues of symptoms just won't do. Generational psychologizing, also much favored by defensive students and smug journalists, obscures the worldwide role of, for example, "alienationist Marxism" as a response to objective social conditions. Whatever the signs of adolescent pathology, our ideologies and realities go beyond them. The many omissions will also puzzle any informed reader. Though highly detailed on American student protests, the peace movement gets ignored, perhaps because mostly peaceful and moral and right, or fatuously dismissed: "father favors a policy of war in Vietnam, therefore, the rebellious sons are for peace."

Other comments on the American scene seem equally simple-minded. He repeatedly insists on a traditional "generational equilibrium" all through American history. Patently, Feuer does not know much about Protestant family life or the rest of our social history of often overwhelming generational hostilities. His application of the extreme patterns of secret conspiracy and terrorism of the Eastern European nihilist movement of the 19th century to American universities, where they do not exist, requires a falsification of the social context. American history of the frontier and Indian wars, of slavery and later racism, of conquest and colonialism, of half a dozen wars, of labor struggles and industrial control, and of police and military powers, reveals our considerable violence and terrorism but, like our recent assassinations, relatively little of it by students. Modern destruction, immorality and terrorism, in America as in much of the rest of the world, does not come mainly from students because it is the prerogative and practice of the governments.

To discredit student movements, Feuer insists both on their universal violence and on its piddling effects. He attacks student rebels for pretentiously large political efforts but also for their "masochism" when they don't use violence, and for their selfishness when they merely seek the "advantages" of university reform. Yet he mirrors their greatest exaggerations in such claims as that the "paranoid psychology" of both Stalinism and czarism were largely responses to student rebels and terrorism. Stalin, he tells us, was becoming more liberal in the 1930s, until he found out that some students were talking of plots against him. Apparently, then, we should blame

rebellious students for much of the police state, the murderous purges, the slave-labor camps, and the genesis of totalitarianism. (Hasn't such American paranoid logic, in which dissent engenders the worst horrors, increased markedly in recent years?) Feuer reinforces such interpretations by insisting on a universal pathology in student movements of "terrorism, amorality, elitism, and suicidalism." In his account, all student movements on five continents display these tendencies as well as "contempt for rational democracy" and an irrational hatred of "liberalism."

In scattered comments we can gain some notion of what Feuer means by democratic liberalism: "The money-seeking of the scorned middle classes . . . has been in the long run the chief force for rationality and liberal values." (I suggest that charming statement as a corporate recruiting slogan.) His liberal suggestions include "the therapy" for student criticisms: economic deprivation to encourage submissive hard "work and discipline" as preparation for mature roles in a hierarchically competitive society. We must laugh at a professor of social philosophy who finds radical social critics "parasitic," and who righteously opposes support for students because,

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\*N.Y. Times Editorial, March 15, 1969

like "amnesty" for protesters, it constitutes the special treatment of anti-democratic "elitism." He favors students taking up engineering since such practicality avoids the "fantasy" of literary study and the "alienation" of philosophical study, both of which appeal to rebels "unable to adapt to prosaic vocations." Inability to make any real criticism of authorities seems essential since any "de-authoritization" of the elders in power provides the crucial condition for generational revolt. Thus elliptically, Feuer expresses the current conservative view that any revolt against any authority is irrational, and all dissent is dangerous.

What of nonstudent and senior-citizen radicals? Condemn them, too, because they are hopelessly and "permanently fixated in the stage of adolescent revolt." Those radicals who can claim some intellectual discipline, unlike the trouble-making "bohemian" hangers-on and too "comfortable" graduate students, must be seen as the most evil: "in the homosexual-power needs [of dissenting intellectuals] from Plato to Bakunin to Paul Goodman, one discerns the unconscious source of the fixated 'non-student' radical." (Feuer does not use the popular idiom, such as "dirty anarchist faggot," only the attitude.) He allows that student movements do provide a low level of "intellectual ferment" and express a wide-ranging "idealism" which masks their rebellious pathology, but they always fail (not only locally but in the revolutions of 1848, 1905, Paris in 1968, etc.) and make things worse ultimately (repressive Russia, immoral Berkeley, dictatorial Cuba, chaotic China, etc.), because of "political death worship, not of life."

Nightmare, indeed. But couldn't we make Feuer's argument more rational and subtle by removing the whole structure of psychologisms and renegade moralisms? Certainly some dubious characteristics of modern student rebels deserve criticism, including the transitory engagements and youthful contradictions and, in this society, somewhat synthetic style because of desperation amidst amorphous repressions. (We can ignore Feuer's disapproval of such disorderly tendencies as high spirits, indecorousness, communalism, varied eroticism and moral heroism.) Obviously, student rebelliousness and protest include irrational elements, a few of them "generational" projections of Oedipal problems. Each social form of thought and action has its peculiar madness.

But a generational conflict requires a repressive father, however genially disguised, as well as a rebellious son. And, contrary to such conservatives as Feuer, emasculation is not just a hobby of the young. In fact, and not just in Oedipal

fantasy, Russian czars and commissars were vicious tyrants; in social reality, not just in adolescent psychodramas, American fathers maintain exploitative, militarized, unjust and increasingly meaningless institutions. On any balanced account, the sins of the fathers, and their generational irrationalities, provide more than half the story. "Projective politics," the ideological acting-out of psychological problems, spreads far beyond student movements. They may hold less of a monopoly on it than obsessively fearful defenders of things-as-they-are. And the radical student sins? Relatively small. Their least pleasant characteristics, such as intolerance and dogmatism, are not at all generational. The professorate, in fact as well as motive, is far more guilty of "elitism." Most "terrorism" is official. American businessmen and bureaucrats show far more "amoralism" than Ameri-

can students. And a dehumanized responsiveness, including the anxious negation of dissent and rebelliousness, may be the greatest "suicidalism," though we have created a world in which no one is immune from "death-worship."

"Wisdom," Feuer assures us, is "what the old tell the young." That arrogance increasingly becomes fungoid knowledge, further exposed by recent rebels lifting a few of our painted rocks. Those of us no longer young may hope for a different wisdom which develops from the opposition of the young, from a critically open responsiveness, and from a sympathy with what we no longer are. We fathers, surrogate and actual, should less be propounding wisdom than engaging it, by understanding and loving rather than putting down sons and students, and the possibilities for a radically better society.

## The Perils of Pragmatism

THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY. By Peter F. Drucker. Harper & Row. 394 pp. \$7.95.

### ARTHUR S. MILLER

Mr. Miller is professor of law at George Washington University. He is the author of *Racial Discrimination and Private Education* (University of North Carolina Press) and *The Supreme Court and American Capitalism* (Free Press).

"'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone," lamented John Donne at the dawn of the scientific age. That prescient forecast is the theme of Peter F. Drucker's new book, *The Age of Discontinuity*. What the poet saw centuries ago the economist has now documented.

Drucker, professor of management at New York University's Graduate School of Business, concentrates on "discontinuities" he says are shaping tomorrow's society: new technologies, major changes in the world economy, growing distrust of large organizations (including government), and the "knowledge explosion." These, he suggests, have ended "the age of continuity" and have produced a pressing need for new theory and new constitutional law. The book is a largish smörgåsbord, admittedly a surface skimming of some of the dominant trends of the age. What makes it interesting is not so much Drucker's delineation of the discontinuities. These, after all, are part of the growing accepted wisdom of the day. Rather, it is the insistence on a need for theory and new law: "Ultimately," he says, "we will need new political theory and probably very new constitu-

tional law." Unhappily, however, he does not spell out, either in outline or in detail, what that theory or law might be.

Possibly, that is enough. Perhaps it is sufficient to add another voice to the very few who are crying out for standards to adhere to and philosophies to follow—for a contemporary, relevant ideology, in other words. A few years ago, Daniel Bell, among others, trumpeted an "end of ideology." But that is not the need: It is finally being recognized that any social order cannot be all sail and no rudder, that islands of stability must exist, that adherence must be made to some sort of external standard if a viable political order is to exist. There is, consequently, an incipient but growing demand, which Drucker joins, for ideological standards and for law that is openly and avowedly instrumental, for law, that is, that knows what it wants and is not a mere memorandum.

The recognition comes at a time when, as Yeats said, "the best lack all conviction," but "the worst are filled with passionate intensity." A failure of nerve (coupled, perhaps, with what David Riesman once called "the nerve of failure") has smashed the liberal dream. There should be no dancing in the streets at the spectacle, for the dream was a fine one: it posited that Man Thinking, in Emerson's term, could settle his problems through rational debate and discourse. Apparently, however, this no longer is believed (if, indeed, it ever was, save in the ideal). Ours is distinctly not the "civilization of the dialogue," at least not yet.

For Drucker is not the first, nor will he be the last, to state the need for something more than pragmatism in policy making. To be sure, pragmatism (that poor excuse for not having a philosophy) or the pragmatic attitude is a necessary and even desirable attribute—so far as it goes. The trouble is that it does not go very far, or not nearly far enough. In and of itself, it fails to provide for adequate goals and for standards by which alternative means of reaching them might be evaluated.

Almost a decade ago, Henry Kissinger (now a White House guru) in *The Necessity for Choice*, pointed up some of the shortcomings of the pragmatic approach in policy making. Maintaining that such an approach, as illustrated by official action in the federal government, involves a tendency to identify a policy issue with a search for empirical data,

Kissinger asserted that this resulted in consensus being the test for validity. Policy making hence became a search for the common denominator. This type of pragmatism is more concerned with method than with judgment; it seeks to reduce judgment or to equate it with methodology. The result is a vicious circle: "As long as our high officials lack a framework of purpose, each problem becomes a special case. But the more fragmented the approach to policy becomes, the more difficult it is to act consistently and purposefully. The typical pattern of our governmental process is therefore endless debate over whether a given set of circumstances is a problem, until a crisis removes all doubts and also the possibility of effective action." One need only point to the Vietnamese quagmire to show how that type of policy making ends.

Others have echoed similar notions. For example, Hans Morgenthau, writing about "the perils of empiricism" in 1962, said that the terms "pragmatism" and "empiricism" were used with pride in Washington, "as though to be pragmatic and empirical when faced with a political problem were to be rational almost by definition." In the Kennedy era, one of the highest accolades an official could receive was to be called a "hard-headed pragmatist"; and it is revealing, and indeed sobering, that President Nixon when introducing his Cabinet saw fit to call them "pragmatic centrists." That is a dreary repetition of history.

Bernhard Bechhoefer's *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*, published in 1961, ought to be required reading by those pragmatic centrists. It is a detailed account of how the pragmatic attitude has permeated and plagued foreign policy

## Poems by Paul Zweig

### ON WILLPOWER

*Ambush in peace  
And you may destroy the shadow  
That lies in ambush around you;  
  
For only the animal  
You are not hunting will be seen,  
Though leaves shake with concealed life,  
  
And only the unbaited hook  
Is sweet for fish.  
  
The shaken branch is hungry  
For its own fruit.*

### TAKING OFF THE FACE

*He lies near the tree with broad leaves,  
Waiting for the soldiers to trudge noisily  
Behind the hill, and the bodies of the dead  
To gather silence over them.*

*The hunter leans against a birchtree  
In the yellow afternoon.  
His boots scar the moss-covered stones;  
The quietness, sucked like a breath  
Out of the broken-chested bird  
At his feet.*

*I remember this face in the dirt,  
And how I played with it, asking  
It questions, unable  
To pull the face off, because it fit.*

### DON'T WALK

*It said don't walk.  
I didn't walk.  
It said lie down,  
I opened my book, answering it:  
"On my rights as a citizen of this book  
I will not lie down. I will walk.  
I will steal pears, even in the Garment District,  
Even in New Jersey.  
I will not confess that I am a man.  
At the bloody games I will shout for blood,  
Leaving my mother out of it,  
Rubbing my eyes for sheer wonderment."*

*Images arise in me in pairs;  
Yesterday they brought me a lump of fat;  
With wrinkles I could read*

*DON'T WALK;  
I didn't walk;  
LIE DOWN;  
And I opened my book.*

### THE PRAYER WHEEL

*Let water lie flat between the trees,  
And the wind blow endlessly toward us  
From a place behind the sun.  
Let my eyes see without holding on.*

*My sadness grows a body  
As it hurries eastward along crowded roads,  
Wobbling near me like a lost wheel.*

making. Speaking of arms control, Bechhoefer said that by 1957 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles "had reached the situation where as a result of years of brilliantly executed tactical maneuvers to meet specific situations, United States foreign policy had become the sum of the tactics and the Secretary of State was imprisoned by it." (Does that suggest what happened in Vietnam? Indeed it does.)

Professor Drucker's call for new theory and new constitutional law thus faces heavy odds when cast against the background of the American tradition. His message that something more than pragmatism is needed (although he does not expressly use that term) is, in effect, a demand for an entirely new way of thinking and acting by Americans, including government officials—a staggering proposition.

Perhaps that new way of thinking will be forthcoming, simply because it is necessary. But it will take a lot of hard work, much more, for example, than went into the community action programs described by Daniel Moynihan in *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*. Required also will be close and continuing attention to the values that should be preserved by the new theory and law. These cannot be left to chance, the accident of political personality, or the brutalities of politics. And that "new constitutional law" can only come about by greatly increased judicial activism, a controversial proposition at best, or by calling a constitutional convention—which could really open a Pandora's box.

In America, and elsewhere in much of the so-called "free world," government has never followed a thought-out ideology. Theory has come after, not before, the fact, and was produced by academics and other scribblers trying to find some order in a disordered universe. For example, American economic policy, as William Letwin has said, has been determined more by "political balance" than "economic consistency."

Today, even government officials are beginning to recognize the need for something more. In net effect, installing "program budgeting" by Robert McNamara in the Pentagon and throughout the Executive branch by President Johnson was predicated on a simple yet revolutionary thought—that it is better to know what one wants and is trying to do than to mill around in the dark without guidelines. That the McNamara revolution failed, at least partially, should not be taken to mean that it will not ultimately prevail. It probably is one of those ideas "whose time has come."

The problems Drucker discusses indicate that Americans, as a nation, had

better know what they want, and soon, for they do not have much time. The very least that must be done is to eliminate what former Bureau of the Budget Director Charles Schulze called "ad-hocery" in governmental decision making. In short, the time has come to recognize the perils of pragmatism.

It is odd that in Drucker's chronicle of discontinuities he does not grapple with the problem of what ought to be, save in passing. He does call for "reprivatization," by which is meant "a systematic policy of using . . . the non-governmental institutions of the society of organizations for the actual 'doing'" of governmental jobs. Political theory and social theory, he further maintains, must come together again after being separate for the last 250 years. The uni-

versities, business organizations and hospitals, to name only three examples, should be seen as organs for the accomplishment of governmental results.

That, of course, is what is being done (see, e.g., James Ridgeway's work, *The Closed Corporation*). Drucker's failure lies in not seeing that "reprivatization" ineluctably leads to a merger of political and economic power—which means, in briefest terms, that what is being built in the United States, not by design but by the slow accretion of myriad transactions between government and the various "private" associations, is the "corporate state, American style." If this form of social order is to protect traditional constitutional values, then we had better get on with the job of producing that new theory Drucker wants.

## Criticism and Self-Criticism

**OBSOLETE COMMUNISM:** The Left-Wing Alternative. By Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit. Translated by Arnold Pomerans. McGraw-Hill Book Co. 256 pp. \$5.95.

### LESLIE DERFLER

Mr. Derfler teaches at the University of Massachusetts. He is the author of *The Third French Republic: 1870-1940* (Princeton) and is at work on a biography of Alexandre Millerand.

The French Communist party, or at least its Central Committee, has in recent years been the object of considerable criticism. The long history of subservience to Moscow and the gyrations that issued from it in the years 1935, 1939 and 1941 have been amply documented. In the postwar period, so has the party's unequivocal denunciation of the Titoist "heresy," its well-staged trials of such deviationists as André Marty and Charles Tillon, and its rejection of any active role in the Algerian War debate—the last largely a result of Russia's emphasis upon retaining the support of French nationalists opposed to German rearmament.

Despite the CPF's revisionist overtures to social democracy and current reassessment of its role as a political party, François Fejtö (*The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism*, 1967) has stated flatly that if the CPF is no longer "the party of unconditional fidelity," no one is asking it to be. Revisionism notwithstanding, France's Communists have adjusted their position to a more comprehensive strategy, one still determined by the "general interests of the Soviet Union and the CPSU." The party executive's denuncia-

tion of Israel in 1967 and initial readiness to defend Russian policy in Czechoslovakia, tend to support that conclusion; although in both cases they were forced to retreat before the overwhelming opposition of party intellectuals and the rank and file.

Much of the reportage on last May's "revolution" (the work of a swarm of writers, politicians and activists setting forth their views in endless books, articles and pamphlets) has duly noted, on the one hand, the party's refusal to support rebellious students and striking workers and, on the other, its willingness to negotiate with the government to bring an end to the revolt. But it would be difficult to find an account as critical in its judgments and as ready to hang its criticisms on an all-enveloping analytical framework as that of Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit.

The Cohn-Bendits plainly state that they do not intend to write a history of *les événements* of last May. They have kept their word: one seeking a description of the student revolt and general strike will have to go elsewhere. The authors have instead analyzed the role of the participants, and examined the state's response in particular and the "Gaullist phenomenon" in general. They also detail the "Stalinist bureaucracy" of the French Communist party and how, in their opinion, it differed little from counterrevolutionary tendencies displayed by the Bolsheviks themselves after 1917.

The chapters covering the May events stress the democratic participation of students and workers and repeatedly place the blame for its outcome on an unholy alliance of "liberals, Stalinist bureaucrats, and reformists"—that is, on

"all the bureaucrats, Right, Left, and Center, who sank their differences in order to eliminate a common danger to the power of each of them." The Grenelle Labor Agreement of May 27, providing the greatest working-class benefits since the Liberation, thus comes off as a sordid deal in which Pompidou saved the Communist party and its federation of unions and, in exchange, Georges Séguy, the Communist union leader, shored up the government. But it is the betrayal by the party that is stressed and documented; this is the message of the book. The spontaneity and revolutionary creativity of French students and workers, similar to that of Russian workers and soldiers after the October Revolution, was crushed by the defenders of "hideous bureaucratization," seen here as much a characteristic of communism as of Gaullism. The original German title, *Linksradikalismus, Gewaltkur gegen die Alterskrankheit des Kommunismus*, and the title of the French edition, *Le gauchisme, remède à la maladie séniale du communisme*, drive home the pathological quality of contemporary communism even more than does their English equivalent.

If this analysis of the student-workers' revolt assumes familiarity with the sequence of events, it also reaffirms points made elsewhere: the bleakness and overcrowding of Nanterre, the catalytic qualities of the Vietnamese War. The heavily analytical format doubtless was patterned after Marx's great histories of 19th-century French revolutionary upheavals; but it is unlikely that had Marx participated in any of them he could have displayed Daniel Cohn-Bendit's astonishing ability for almost total self-effacement. One would never know from this account that Daniel Cohn-Bendit was leader of the Nanterre March 22 Movement and was supported by the Trotskyist Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire, the most formidable student pressure group on the French Left. Nor does the book recount his vilification by both Communists and Gaullists. The reader cannot help looking for and missing the personal touches he alone could have provided.

Instead, we have endless demonstrations of the CPF's perfidy: On May 8, at the Place du Luxembourg, Communist lecturers called on students to disperse, an action which, if followed, "would have spelled the end of the movement before it had a chance to express its real demands." Less than two weeks later the party denounced the proposed May 16 march as provocative and, feeling isolated, student leaders called it off. It was a leader of the Revolutionary Communist Youth who, at the Place de

l'Opéra the night of May 24, turned back to the Latin Quarter a crowd that had earlier set fire to the stock exchange. And it was the Communist-led CGT—described by its boss, Georges Séguy, as "*la grande force tranquille*"—that ordered its shop stewards to discourage workers from continuing the strike, and deliberately misled and demoralized them by spreading false reports, as in the case of the Paris transport workers, that fellow workers elsewhere had returned to their jobs. The CGT managed to regain control of its union membership, sued for peace and thus ended a strike of 10 million workers, something that the government had been unable to do.

That for the Cohn-Bendits the CGT action made all the difference was demonstrated by the Saint-Nazaire locals, more leftist than their national leadership, which continued to strike, but in hopeless isolation. It cannot be denied that there was a deadly consistency in all of this. Ever since its quest for respectability got under way in the Presidential election campaign of 1965, the party was striving to stop direct action and had paid the price of turning away an entire generation of radical youth—and most notably destroying its own student organization.

Two guiding principles for Communist party behavior are identified: (1) its model of society, hierarchical, machine-dominated, consumer-oriented and consequently, like the actual model, bureaucratic; (2) its residual subordination to the Soviet Union. An internal contradiction results: the party plays the reformist game, running candidates for office and entering into electoral alliances and, at the same time, remains revolutionary in theory. It rejected the revolutionary movement of May precisely because the uprising so violently exposed the contradiction.

The May experience, however, is valuable because it will have helped to shatter the myth identifying revolution as the work of a party committed to it. It is in an effort to demolish that myth in its greatest historical form that the Cohn-Bendits review the 1917 Revolution, when by Trotsky's admission the masses were to the left of the Bolshevik party. The authors introduce a variety of material, ranging from *What Is To Be Done?*—in order to demonstrate Lenin's lack of faith in the masses' ability to initiate revolutionary action and so justify the need for leadership—to revolutionary syndicalism's *Charter of Amiens*—to illuminate the workers' radical potential without the need of a party, and their ability to rise above a "trade union mentality" and to call for genuine and thoroughgoing revolution.

the apostle of the revolutionary spontaneity of the masses, now the resurrected goddess of student revolt, Rosa Luxembourg. Cited as well is the counterrevolutionary behavior of the Bolshevik party in firing on the Kronstadt sailors and in destroying the Ukrainian Makhno movement.

One experiences a despairing *déjà vu*



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in all of this. It recalls the criticism made by Communists (revolutionary) against Social Democrats (counterrevolutionary). It was a French Communist, Maurice Thorez, who most loudly echoed his Comintern bosses in reserving the greatest criticism, not for reactionaries but for those other heirs of Marxism who continually "applied the brakes to mass action." The same charges of bureaucratic ossification were leveled by *minoritaires* against French Socialists fifty years ago, and similar tendencies on the part of German Social Democracy were amply analyzed by Robert Michels.

If this means the Left is able to renew

itself continually, it also means that the critics have largely replaced the objects of their criticism, and in having adopted similar structures and behavior patterns, are now criticized in turn. Disappointed revolutionaries have accused the CPF of betraying the revolution—and doubtless there is a case to be made here. But one wishes they had expended half as much time and energy in exploring the possibility of an alternate explanation for its failure, namely that the great majority of workers—and perhaps even students—are more reformist, and the modern state less vulnerable, than the Cohn-Bendits suppose.

## Salka's Incurable Heart

THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS.  
By Salka Viertel. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 338 pp. \$6.95.

### HAROLD CLURMAN

One aspect of this book which it would please its publishers to have emphasized is that its author knew so many famous people—especially those Middle Europeans who from 1933 to the early fifties made Hollywood their home. Mrs. Viertel's residence in the Santa Monica canyon was the haven of all the luminaries who for at least a decade found themselves—as Brecht expressed it—"exiles in paradise." In this sense her book is history as well as biography.

In telling her life story at the age of 70 plus, Salomea Sara Viertel (née Steuermann), better known as Salka, has written a book of love. I designate it in this fashion not in reference to the pages which deal with her romance with the man she married but because of her capacity for love of children, friends, men and women of good will and talent.

This gift of love, this passion for life, is rarer than we suppose. It triumphs over age, adversity, ego. Because she was so endowed, all the "big names"—some of them monsters of egocentricity—clung to her for solace and for purification.

Born in Poland, Salka was the oldest of four children of a distinguished family. Her father was the first Jewish mayor in the town of her birth. The children were tutored at home and at an early age became fluent in German, French, Russian, as well as Polish. Her musician brother, Edward Steuermann, developed into a renowned pianist, teacher and, through performance, champion of Schoenberg, Webern, Berg. Enamored of the theatre, Salka became an actress.

She appeared in classic German and contemporary European drama in the leading theatrical centers of Germany. Her husband, Berthold Viertel, an Austrian, was not only a successful stage director in Vienna and Berlin but a film director in Hollywood and London, and perhaps most profoundly a poet. His fiery nature and embattled humanism so impressed Christopher Isherwood while they worked together in London that he made Viertel the central figure of his novel *Prater Violet*.

The Viertels came to this country and settled on the West Coast in 1928 because Berthold was engaged as a film director there. Limited by her ignorance of spoken English Salka began to collaborate—often with S. N. Behrman—in the writing of screenplays. Among the best known were the Garbo films, *Queen Christina* and *Anna Karenina*.

The descriptions in *The Kindness of Strangers* of her childhood and of the conditions and personalities of the German stage after the First World War—a most productive theatrical period—are charming, gay, sometimes touching, particularly at the moment when young Salka kisses the hand of the stage director who first consents to train her. But the drama of Salka's life takes on an especially glamorous aura when her home in Hollywood becomes the center of a vast circle of personalities who strive, suffer, celebrate, challenge, create on what I cannot forbear to call an exalted level.

Here Thomas and Heinrich Mann pay tribute to each other in long written addresses at the older brother's birthday. Here Malraux makes his appeal to the moneyed intelligentsia on behalf of Republican Spain. Here Schoenberg is nearly persuaded to consider an offer from

MGM's Thalberg to write the score for *The Good Earth* and refuses it because to him the job means that he must control all the picture's sound—from the instrumental to the inflection of the actors' speech.

To the Viertel hearth come distressed messages from Eisenstein in Mexico protesting the massacre of his film by its backers. Salka attempts to come to Eisenstein's aid, and pleads that he be granted the funds needed to complete the enterprise.

One anecdote recounts Brecht's decision to compromise with the industry by writing a screenplay with Salka (to help her in a moment of financial drought), a real commercial film. But he insists that the heroine of the projected story be a Frenchwoman suspected of collaboration with the Nazis and thus has her head shorn. When Salka points out that no star would agree to appear in a role which demands her "baldness," Brecht remains adamant. Salka's explanation of the rules of the Hollywood game is a gem. It begins: "What producers want is an original but familiar, unusual but popular, moralistic but sexy, tender but violent, slick but highbrow masterpiece. . . ."

Still all this does not constitute the essence of her book. It lies elsewhere. Because Berthold was obliged to accept engagements to write pictures and plays abroad while Salka had to stay at home to care for her four children and to earn money at the studio—the Viertels were never overly affluent—their marital relationship suffered. After several prolonged absences Salka realized that she and her husband could no longer remain lovers. He became attached to another woman, she to another man. Not for a moment did Salka and Berthold lose their deep regard for and close association with each other. Never was there a word of recrimination between them. During their separation they wrote long letters to each other which are among the most genuinely moving love letters I have ever read. This was characteristic of all four people involved, all of whom remained lifetime friends.

When finally Salka (not without some trouble with the U.S. passport bureau in the days of our terror) returned to Europe, to Klosters, Switzerland, where she now resides, she once again became the "mother" of her grandchild after her son's divorce, a continued motherhood subsequent to her daughter-in-law's death.

Salka ends her book with a phrase about her "incurable heart." It is this quality which sustains and ennobles all the artistic, intellectual, social and political events which her book narrates.

It gives us a sense of what it is to be a true person. Without that core of warm humanity all the rest would be vanity. To be meaningfully cultured is to inform everything we think and do with that ingredient which the splendid woman who is Salka Viertel signally exemplifies.

## ART

### LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

James Rosenquist has done another giant painting in sections: the first, in 1965, was "F-111"; the second, painted last year, was "Horse Blinders," recently on view at Leo Castelli's Gallery. The size of both paintings, about 10 feet high and something more than 80 feet long, is dictated by the dimensions of the gallery. The spectator, stepping into Castelli's second-floor front room, was walled in with huge images. The "F-111" had fifty-one sections and Rosenquist told G. R. Swenson that originally he expected it to be sold a piece at a time: each bit would be incomplete, a souvenir of the original. In the end the painting stayed together so that the radical idea of atomistic dispersal was lost. "Horse Blinders" has fewer sections (I counted fourteen vertical ones) and it looks as if Rosenquist has withdrawn from his distribution-by-fragmentation idea. These canvases are interspersed with aluminum sheets, which always occur at the corners of the rooms so that they reflect, in reverse and somewhat blurred, the painting at right angles to them. Breaking up the sequence, or even hanging "Horse Blinders" in another space, would reduce the changing reflections which are, I think, a part of its success.

Rosenquist's earlier work tends to fall short as color; his tonal handling of form (he was trained in the sky above Times Square) was expert and convincing, but his color was subservient to tonal values, that is to say to colors used one at a time. He established color zones: one would be all pink, another all gun-metal gray, another the orange of spaghetti. These zones have been intensifying in color lately but not until now has his color really become active, the equal, as a pictorial factor, of his tonal definition of form. The aluminum sheets, which in "F-111" were used to give what the artist called "a brittle feeling," in contrast to the canvas, contribute to his new vivid color. There is a full range over the spectrum: flaring orange, cloudy purple, pale blue, brilliant yellow, livid red. And the colors fuse with one another, overlap and infiltrate, with

a coloristic resource not found in the earlier paintings.

What is the subject of "Horse Blinders"? The title refers to the apparatus worn by horses to block peripheral vision and thus reduce sources of sudden alarm, horses being nervous creatures. The connection of this to the painting isn't clear, though presumably the artist is either (1) freeing us of *our* blinders so we can see more widely, or (2) implying that the objects in his painting act like horse blinders on us, their users. In terms of object recognition, the picture is about kitchen technology. Reading from right to left, which is the way attention moved in the gallery, the following items are legible: a finger (like an image from an ad for touch control), an ATT cable, its color-coded wires opening out like a bouquet; a motion study of a spoon beating food in a bowl, followed by energy patterns in wave form; a block of butter melting in a pan over a glowing burner; finally a telephone cord (motion study again) and a blurred mass (flesh?).

Rosenquist's method of composition is that of montage, the photographic and figurative extension of collage. Whereas in Cubist collage separate bits of material are assembled in a mainly flat space, montage unites imagery from separate sources in a *scenic* way. It is the method of Soviet movies of the twenties, and of iconographically ambitious WPA murals in which allegorical figures, representative American types, and pylons mingle and interpenetrate. In Rosenquist's pictures slices of images, each one highly naturalistic in detail, are taken from half-legible sources. Forms are defined as obscure bosses of advancing detail or as amorphous surfaces that expand into what the artist once called "immediate infinity." The effect is of objects slipping out of focus, losing their boundaries. Enlargement and identity loss reinforce each other: the result of his giantism is doubt, not clarity. Often the transitions from one zone of a painting to another are more emphatic in their color change than in the objects defined internally in each zone.

Rosenquist explained the significance of a detail in the earlier big picture, which included an A-bomb mushroom, by saying: "Then next, that's an underwater swimmer wearing a helmet with an air bubble above his head, an exhaust air bubble that's related to the breath of the atomic bomb. His 'gulp' of breath is like the 'gulp' of the explosion. It's an unnatural force, man made." There is no doubt that the objects in their order in "Horse Blinders" could also be annotated in this way. However, just as his objects are painted in a way that

makes them simultaneously explicit yet evasive, so the interjection of allegory is felt by the spectator, but without his becoming dependent on the artist's explanation. There is, I think, an inherent obscurity in Rosenquist's work, though I do not mean this in a derogatory sense. Indeed, the function of obscurity in his work is to protect him from the banal. The "F-111" is, in format, like a WPA mural: "Horse Blinders," except for its obscurity, could be a "Wonders of the Technical Age" mural or a fold-out in an encyclopedia. Undoubtedly, Rosenquist thinks in terms of objects with symbolic meanings and in terms of allegories about man's place in society, but his moralism, though articulate, is secretive.

Rosenquist's forms are all derived from recognizable objects split off from their familiar context. In this respect his practice resembles that of the Pop artists with whom he used to be associated. Pop art made a great play in the recontextualizing of common materials and unprocessed objects within the traditional field of art. Though highly aware of the sign systems they were using, Pop artists to a man refrained from assigning symbolic function to their forms. Rosenquist, though equally sensitive to the man-made landscape, seems always to have thought about it allegorically, in terms of what was good for man or what machines were doing to people. He has failed to materialize these Great Thoughts, but he has done something else infinitely more interesting.

Dutch artists of the 17th century

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could assign symbolic meaning to their realistic subjects without weakening the illusion of things seen, but Rosenquist cannot communicate with society in unshared symbols. What we can do, as spectators, however, is to view his art in relation to our common experience of objects, even if the system by which they are ordered is out of reach. Then we can see the brilliance of his achievement as, by means of a naturalistic technique, he presents us with de-realized

objects. Rosenquist is the painter of the objects and spaces of our world, but as they slip out of focus, enormous but lost. It has been said that Pop art has shown us the art and objects of the city, bringing neglected aspects of life back into view. Rosenquist, who more than anybody else was responsible for realizing a realistic potential within Pop art, does the reverse. He paints the world in all those episodes in which we lose our grip on it.

are faults, but not fatal in a work so slight and modest. A love story develops sweetly between the two Westerners, thrown together by the menacing strangeness of India. And it is all worked out against an extraordinarily beautiful background of rivers, cities and coastal waters. Ivory, who has lived there for many years and worked under the great Indian director, Ray, has a superb eye for the visual glories of the land. It is, of course, a very partial impression that he gives, but the sores and torments of India would not have fitted his mood of gently satiric romance.

Pier Paolo Pasolini tells us that the Visitor (Terence Stamp) of his *Teorema* is not Christ, and invites us to decide whether he is god or devil. I'd say he was a rather debased (and certainly unanimated) Dionysus, who on this occasion moves in on one of those Milanese commercial families whom Italian directors enjoy transporting by limousine from one palatial residence to another. Stamp's influence is defined to be utterly inescapable; he emanates a power whose nature is suggested by close-up shots of his fly (a kind of male cheesecake that becomes distastefully funny with repetition), and by virtue of which he seduces everyone, young and old, male and female, in the household. This experience is implied to be transcendent, but it in no way enlarges or liberates the recipients. Instead, on the departure of the Visitor, they collapse into various forms of madness.

It may be Pasolini's lesson that the touch of a god is fatal to those who have already forsaken life, and it may be for that reason that, whereas the members of the family sink into self-destructive deterioration, the maid of all work is elevated to self-destructive saintliness (in one scene she levitates). But if that was the intention, I wonder why the teenage son and daughter were so afflicted; they appeared sufficiently avid for life. And in any case the melancholy history is carried out with a literalness—*Teorema* meaning "Theorem"—that required more suspension of belief than I could muster. Perhaps such visitations are more persuasive in Italy than they are here, though I should have thought Milan the least susceptible area. In any case, if a parable was intended, the execution seemed to me too automatic and mechanical to make it effective. Possession by an alien spirit will work as metaphor, but literal possession five times repeated with humorless efficiency becomes tedious puppetry. I recognize that Pasolini is trying to say something religiously significant about good and evil, but his didacticism stood between me and his vision.

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## FILMS

### ROBERT HATCH

James Ivory draws his films from the shifting cultural forces of post-empire India. His *Shakespeare Wallah* was a gently melancholy, quietly funny, J.B. Priestley sort of piece about a British road company trying to hang on to the only life it knows in a time when the English are going home and the hitherto "assimilated" Indians are turning from Bardolatry to inspirations from their own aesthetic past.


His current *Guru* is a much sunnier picture, a sympathetically laughing study of Indian perplexity in the face of England's new youth. Utpal Dutt plays a musician of the stature, say, of Shankar. He has two British pupils—Rita Tushingham, an East-intoxicated girl of no discernible talent, and Michael York, a candid, tough-minded rock star who, perhaps with a side glance at the Beatles, has decided that some familiarity with the sitar will do his career no harm. Miss Tushingham is content to gaze up from the feet of her guru with enormous, unfocused eyes, which feeds the ego of the emotionally rather insecure master; York wants lessons at so much an hour, which provides no ego nourishment at all.

The key to the film's humane success is Dutt's role and performance. The guru is a multiply imperfect man, vain, self-indulgent, dictatorial, given to explosions of anger he lacks the courage to sustain. Nevertheless, he is seen to be a fine artist and a man whose instincts are greatly more decent than his impulses. York and Miss Tushingham are more one-dimensional; he colorfully entertaining, she more uninvolved than is her customary manner. True, she is supposed to be playing a misty-minded girl, but either that is a thing she cannot do or Ivory failed to make the part convincing to her. As a result she seems sometimes to be watching the action when she should be creating it.

That and Ivory's generally slack timing

# Crossword Puzzle No. 1296

FRANK W. LEWIS



## ACROSS

- 1 Such retainers wouldn't insult one, but their system has merit, reputedly. (5,8)
- 10 How they used to dance a short distance away? (3,4)
- 11 Where one can shoot pictures associated with it. (7)
- 12 ..... and they can shoot important players, as well. (9)
- 13 Scratch the record? It might take a long time to get the point. (5)
- 14 Wrap up, as the student might. (6)
- 16 Buster does, naturally! (8)
- 19 Does it contain the main course, with coasters alongside? (8)
- 20 and 24 down What makes things stiff and yellow? One might make an arbitrary decision! (4,7)
- 22 Parisian gold award? (5)
- 23 Descriptive of the sound of 9, with all we get out of it! (5,4)
- 25 Did little workers go off with it? (The association could be mine!) (5-2)
- 26 Quakers probably do. (7)
- 27 The force of atmospheric disturbance? (5,8)

## DOWN

- 2 Powerless. (5)
- 3 A bare description might imply the heart line got the works. (2,3,10)

- 4 Infective. (6)
- 5 14 perhaps—soprano or tenor? (8)
- 6 Usually presented in a low 5, proving the depth of the nap. (6,2,3,4)
- 7 One might win the competition on points. (3-6)
- 8 Desserts should at last be sticky, reputedly. (8)
- 9 That old city fatigue, it seems! (4)
- 15 To gather the salient feature, as one might in returning to the office? (9)
- 17 Ill-gotten riches (about a couple of pounds) made by the poet? (8)
- 18 Inside murals shouldn't be, if the point is stretched. (5-3)
- 21 Bits or pieces of the tavern? (6)
- 22 Like a blonde with a modest make-up? (4)
- 24 See 20 across

## SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1295

ACROSS: 1 Indoor sport; 9 Cyst; 10 and 28 Elbow room; 12 Forrest; 15 and 11 Skeleton crew; 16 Deaden; 18 Obeyed; 21 Moby Dick; 24 Drawers; 26 Details; 29 and 17 Block and tackle; 31 Underhanded. DOWN: 2 Naturally; 3 Overset; 4 Robe; 5 Powered; 6 Racer; 7 and 13 By hook or crook; 8 Remote; 14 Enemy; 19 Barrow; 20 Durable; 22 Break in; 23 Colons; 25 and 30 Womankind; 27 Goth.

Readers are invited to send for a free copy of Mr. Lewis' "ground rules." Address Puzzle Department, *The Nation*, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10014.

## PERSONALS

### Looting the Jew is Not a Gift

When you are promised some Jew's job, or his business, or other asset, are you being offered a gift?

When you abandon a system of justice thru equity, and enlist as the ward of some anti-Semitic tough guy, you are accepting the chains of dependence on your tough guy master.

For a while the price will be easy. You won't be asked to shoulder a gun to commit brutal slaughter right away. You won't be asked to engage in treachery against your family and neighbors right away. You won't be ordered to destroy all the enlightenment and civilization of centuries right away.

But you can be sure all these things are somewhere just over the horizon.

Many affluent people deride the idea that they will become "pragmatically" anti-Semitic. Yet they live in a careless, senseless, reckless manner, which may bring consequences that will make anti-Semitism seem like the only straw they can grasp in a frantic effort to "save themselves." Scape-goat anti-Semitism as a face saving device to rescue their pride and self-esteem; anti-Semitic looting to salvage their finances.

When that time comes how can you be sure you haven't been programmed into experiencing anti-Semitic tensions?

Bear in mind the future cost, the future cost, the future cost.

D. Koretz, 521 Park, Detroit, MI 48226

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
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